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Mapping the Commonwealth Countries’ 
Participation in Global Value Chains 
1. Introduction  
More than two-thirds of world trade in manufacture occurs within global value chains (GVC). 
GVCs involve production where the output of one firm in a country is used by another firm in 
another country to produce a more complex product which, in turn, may be used by another 
firm for further processing (IDE-JETRO et al. 2019) before being consumed as a final product. 
The growing interdependence and integration of national economies has led GVCs to be inter-
nationally fragmentated; this changed the organisation of production and placed the speciali-
sation of countries within GVCs at the centre stage of industrialisation strategies (Antras and 
Gortari, 2019).  
The Commonwealth countries are increasingly important in world trade. The share of Com-
monwealth countries’ goods and services exports represents 15% of total world trade, according 
to 2018 figures. Intra-Commonwealth trade represents 17% of Commonwealth exports of goods 
and 15% of their imports. Export growth has not been similar in all countries, some Asian 
Commonwealth members export more than the others. For instance, Commonwealth Trade 
Review (2016) reports that countries like Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Singapore and Sri Lanka accounted for 41.1% of the combined total Commonwealth 
exports of goods and services in 2016.  
From a developmental perspective, the surge in developing countries participation in interna-
tional trade, and in particular in GVCs has changed the understanding of how countries trade. 
The concept of the country of origin or destination does not apply anymore within GVCs since 
significant shares of the value traded may come from other countries than from the country of 
origin ascribed by customs records (Escaith, 2014). As Dollar (2019) says “net imports are no 
longer a proper measure of the impact of an international trade shock on the domestic economy 
in the age of GVCs”.  
Despite the growing participation of Commonwealth member countries in trade and a bur-
geoning research program on GVCs, the measurement of value of domestic vs. imported con-
tent embodied and the backward and forward linkages between and across between the 53 
Commonwealth countries is incomplete. Mapping Commonwealth countries GVCs, i.e. identi-
fying where value-added is initially created and ultimately consumed, how much and by whom, 
is a challenge given that most trade consists of parts and components, with semi-finished prod-
ucts going back and forth along the production chain between countries.  
For this purpose, the report analyses Commonwealth value chains from an inter-industrial 
network perspective. The analysis examines international flows of trade in value added and 
countries’ position within GVCs to highlight the level of interconnectedness between the 
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Commonwealth members and how countries’ export competitiveness is dependent on the 
sourcing of inputs, and access to final producers and consumers in third countries. The infor-
mation is organised as follows: 
Section 2 reviews the definition and related literature on the growing importance of GVCs in 
international trade. This section provides a framework within which to contextualise GVCs 
and examines relevant literature on GVCs. Section 3 provides a brief description of the data, 
and methodology employed for empirical analysis. The data for analysis is based on the Com-
monwealth countries’ input-output (IO) tables which are drawn from EORA data reported for 
2015 and the UNCTAD-EORA simulation (“nowcasting”) based on the IMF World Economic 
Outlook for 2016-2018. Section 4 presents an overview on the evolution of Commonwealth 
countries in GVC trade and maps the dynamics of trade linkages between countries. This sec-
tion discusses a series of GVC indicators, i.e. backward and forward linkages, length of GVC 
by country and sector, etc. Using network analysis, we comment on the Commonwealth coun-
tries’ GVC participation. Section 5 looks at estimating the potential for intra-Commonwealth 
trade creation. The discussion is based on the calculation of a series of Trade Complementarity 
indices. The previous sections set the scene for a discussion on the policy recommendations, 
outlined in Section 6, which suggests how policies could be refined to enhance GVC participa-
tion and support Commonwealth countries’ efforts to benefit from GVC linkages. The Tech-
nical Annexes provide an insight into the methodology and explains the computation of GVC 
indicators, backward and forward linkages as well as the length of the value chain. 
2. Supply chains: definition, literature and conceptual un-
derpinnings 
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) define a value chain as the “full range of activities that 
firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond”. The 
concept of GVC was introduced in early 2000 following increasing fragmentation of production 
across countries and the specialisation of countries in ‘tasks’ and business functions rather 
than ‘specific products’ (Gereffi, 1994).  
Recent literature debates the evolution of supply chains and the impact on production from 
trade links between countries and the increasingly dense international trade network of inter-
mediate inputs that include parts and components, natural resources and services (Gereffi et 
al., 2005; UNCTAD/OECD/WTO, 2013; OECD, 2013; Neilson et al., 2014; Coe and Yeung, 
2015; WTO, 2017). Studies find evidence that the current GVC network is both global and 
regional, and the latter comprises three regional blocs commonly called Factory Asia, Factory 
North America, and Factory Europe (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013). 
The existing GVC literature is categorised into three strands; the first two are based on theo-
retical issues around supply chains, and the third is mainly empirical. The first strand views 
that supply chains are a sign of increased efficiency in the globalized system of production. 
This presents the argument of comparative advantage given growth of trade in intermediate 
inputs (Deardorff, 2005; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Baldwin, 2012; Ali and Durash, 
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2011). Blanchard, Bown and Johnson (2016) find that countries integrated in GVCs have lower 
tariff protection.  
The second strand looks at firms and acknowledges the growing importance of networked mul-
tinational firms in global trade (Keane, 2014). Studies show that lead firms (from China and 
India, in particular) have monopolistic market and command negotiation power over third-tier 
suppliers from developing countries (Bigsten et al., 2000; Gereffi et al. 2005; Nolan and Zhang, 
2010; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Nielson, 2014; Nadvi and Horner, 2018).  
The third strand of literature empirically disentangles the domestic and foreign content of 
countries’ trade. Koopman et al. (2014) and Wang et al. (2013) developed methodologies to 
break-down gross trade flows to origin of value-added in Trade in Value Added analysis. Es-
caith (2014) developed the GVC decomposition and network analysis and recent works by Ig-
natenko et al. (2019) and Ahmad (2019) use the GVC lens to examine the complex network 
structure of flows of goods, services, capital and technology across national borders. Increas-
ingly, GVC analysis highlights the complexity of interactions between global producers and 
emphasises the concept of “network” rather than the “chain” (Coe and Hess, 2007). As Hudson 
(2004) mentions “economic processes must be conceptualised in terms of a complex circuitry 
with a multiplicity of linkages and feedback loops rather than just “simple” circuits or, even 
worse, linear flows”.  
Recent work drawing on the network perspective examines the total world input-output net-
work (WION) as a directed and weighted network of country-sector pairs and compute several 
local and global network metrics over a period of time (Cerina et al., 2015). Zhu et al. (2015) 
use this technique and produce a ‘topological view of industry-level GVCs’ as global value trees 
for a large set of pairs country-sector and compute a measure of industry importance based on 
them. Ferrarini (2013) and Amador and Cabral (2013) use international trade data on products 
classified as parts and components to quantify vertical trade among countries and map the 
resulting global network.  
Ukkusuri et al.  (2016) employ the GTAP model to examine the GVC network structure of 
intra- Commonwealth trade. The results report the presence of regional clusters influenced by 
India and South Africa (as Commonwealth countries) and the ability of regional agreements 
(such as EU and NAFTA) to influence the strength and distribution of intra-Commonwealth 
trade. Johnson and Noguera (2012) analyse supply chains regionalisation and find that geo-
graphical distance impacts value-added trade flows across countries. Nadvi and Horner (2018) 
explore the changing geography of global trade and in highlighting the emergence of more 
polycentric trade present evidence of growing role of Southern actors and Southern end mar-
kets.  
Escaith and Inomata (2013) focus on trade in East Asia, they use Input-Output data to meas-
ure value-added to examine the contribution of production networks to industrial development 
and highlight the centrality of policy in shaping industrial development. The work highlights 
the role of policy in fostering regional integration and shows how reductions in variance among 
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tariffs dilute a bias against exports that typically accompanies inwardly-focused industrialisa-
tion strategies based on domestic markets.  
The increasing international fragmentation of production together with large shares of inter-
mediate goods in total trade and intensified reliance on services in production and trade – all 
prominent features of GVC-based production – can be explained by traditional theory but one 
needs to get a complete picture for effective policy making. In the Ricardian and Heckscher-
Ohlin models (the workhorses of international trade) comparative advantage is assumed to be 
“natural” and comes from the unequal distribution of primary production factors such as land, 
labour and capital. In GVCs, what the lead-firm (the firm which is the main driver of upstream 
supply chain and the down-stream sales to the final users) looks for is creating value by select-
ing domestically or internationally the best suppliers of the required tasks – research and 
development, design, production, business services, logistics and distribution. In this process, 
comparative advantages from the lead-firm perspective are “created” instead of “natural”, be-
cause they may not correspond to the factor endowment of the lead-firm country. As a result, 
it is impossible to ignore the close nexus between trade and investment in supply chain pro-
duction, or the fact that products are frequently bundled into single offerings (also referred to 
as “tasks”).  
Several studies examine countries’ trade specialisation and revealed comparative by identify-
ing low and high specialisation patterns. For instance, Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann 
and Klinger (2007) argue that countries’ export specialisation reflects the domestic capabilities 
and determines the development perspective. However, this (pessimistic) view does not ac-
count for the characteristics of GVC trade. The increasing fragmentation of production across 
countries that accompanies the emergence of GVCs blurs the causal relationship between 
(gross) export and the domestic economic structure (Bondani, 2091; Koopman et al., 2010; 
Baldwin, 2012). 
Early efforts to explain and measure production fragmentation include work by Feenstra 
(1998) and Hummels et al., (1999) that focuses on factor content and/or vertical specialisation 
measures. Koopman et al. (2014), Wang et al. (2013) and Johnson and Noguera (2012) propose 
methodologies to examine gross trade flows by the origin of value-added. These focus on the 
value-added content in trade to explain and measure the links between standard trade data 
(measured in gross terms) and trade measured in value-added terms.  
Studies capture the upstream effects by adopting a macro approach based on inter-country or 
world IO tables (see OECD-WTO, 2012 for details). In fact, the use of IO tables to devise alter-
native measures to document how various countries and sectors participate in GVCs has be-
come standard practice (see Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001; Daudin et al., 2006, 2009; Johnson 
and Noguera, 2011; Koopman et al., 2011).  
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3. Estimating ‘Trade in Value-Added’ for the Common-
wealth countries 
The 2013 meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government identified intra-Common-
wealth trade (and investment) as an area for potential growth. Several studies examine the 
“Commonwealth Effect” (Bennet et al., 2010; Shingai and Razzaque, 2015; Khorana and In-
maculade-Zarsoso, 2018; 2019) and find evidence of intra-CW trade in goods. Ukkusuri et al.  
(2016) examine the insertion of Commonwealth countries in the GVC network and report that 
clusters are distributed across different countries, which allows trade growth in those regions 
and offers the potential for interregional partnerships. 
3.1 Data  
Various databases, such as OECD TiVA and WIOD, provide the required data required to 
assess trade in value-added. This project draws on Eora Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) 
table (see Lenzen et al. (2013) for a review of Eora construction) and creates Commonwealth 
member specific database of countries for which data is available.1 Note that data on the fol-
lowing Commonwealth countries is absent in Eora database: Dominica; Grenada; Kiribati; Na-
uru; Saint Lucia; Solomon Islands; St Kitts and Nevis; St Vincent and The Grenadines; Tonga; 
Tuvalu, hence these are not included. Several of these missing countries are classified as Least 
Developed Countries whose integration into GVC presents specific opportunities, due to pref-
erential market access granted to all developed economies and most emerging ones, but also 
specific challenges when these preferences are eroded, see Keane (2018) for a review. 2 
This paper analyses GVC indicators for 43 Commonwealth countries. The indicators examine 
trade within and across the Commonwealth members as well as trade patterns with the main 
G20 trade partners; ‘other countries’ are aggregated into Rest of the World (ROW) region. See 
the list of countries in Annex Table I. The analysis is reported for 2015, which is the data 
included in Eora and for 2016-2018 with the UNCTAD-EORA simulation (“nowcasting”).3  
UNCTAD-Eora database has a broad geographic coverage but it suffers from several limita-
tions.  First, input-output (IO) data at the national level for many countries are not accurate. 
Second, the database relies on aggregated IO data and the sectoral disaggregation of GVC 
flows is coarse, so a lot of GVC activity occurring within the broadly defined sectors goes oc-
culted. Third most national statistics focus on trade flows in merchandise only. Finally, re-
searchers impose strong assumptions in constructing the IO tables to estimate bilateral inter-
mediate input trade flows given that these cannot be readily read from either customs data or 
 
1 Eora was initially developed with the objective of assessing the environmental footprint of international 
trade, and trade in merchandise. 
2 Commonwealth LDCs include Bangladesh, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zambia. Vanuatu is likely to graduate by 2020. 
3 The UNCTAD-Eora Global Value Chain (GVC) database offers global coverage (189 countries and a “Rest 
of World” region) and a timeseries from 1990 to 2019 of the key GVC indicators: foreign value added (FVA), 
domestic value added (DVA) and indirect value added (DVX). Results from 1990 to 2015 are generated from 
EORA Multi-Region Input-Output tables (MRIOs). Results for 2016-2019 are nowcasted based on the IMF 
World Economic Outlook. See https://worldmrio.com/unctadgvc/ 
Background Commonwealth GVC paper: Final draft 
8 
 
national IO tables.4 For instance, an assumption used in creating import matrices is the “pro-
portionality” assumption, which assumes that the share of imports in any product consumed 
directly as intermediate consumption or final demand (except exports) is the same for all users. 
Eora includes data on 26 sectors that have been aggregated as follows:  
• Primary sectors (agriculture, fisheries and mining),  
• Secondary sectors (Manufacture),  
• Tertiary sectors (commercial and administrative services), 
• “Other sectors” (e.g., recycling, household services, re-exports and re-imports), but the 
quality of data was particularly weak, so this has been excluded from analysis.  
The database employed for this analysis includes 58 countries (43 Commonwealth, G20, ROW) 
and three sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary), which results in a 174 by 174 matrix.  
3.2 Methodology 
Several production activities are carried out across different countries within GVCs, with semi-
finished products going back and forth along the production chain between countries. Every 
time a product crosses the national borders international transactions are recorded at the full 
or gross value of the product, and this leads to multiple counting.  
At the end of the supply chain, the parts are assembled for final use and then either absorbed 
domestically as consumption or investment goods, or exported as final good. In GVC trade, the 
concepts of country of origin or country of destination as traditionally understood in trade sta-
tistics do not fully apply: when the national origin of the value-added incorporated in the final 
product is carefully examined, one realizes that significant shares of the value may come from 
other countries than from the country of origin as ascribed by customs records (Escaith, 2014). 
Network analysis provides an insightful analysis of GVCs and examines international flows of 
value added and countries’ position within GVCs by examining the IO relationship between 
any two countries, and takes into account the effect on all other countries. The flows of value 
added in a GVC tend to occur in a sequential way with firms incorporating foreign value added 
as they embody intermediate goods in production subsequently exported for final consumption 
or integrated into other products or service.  
The empirical analysis focuses on the computation of GVC indicators that break down gross 
trade flows by source and destination of value added using global IO matrices.  
The GVC participation index is expressed as a percentage of gross exports and indicates the 
share of foreign inputs in exports of a country and domestically produced inputs used in third 
countries’ exports. Annex I present the technical details and elaborates how to estimate trade 
 
4 The homogeneity and proportionality assumptions are imposed to resolve the issue that the available da-
tasets do not have information on which domestic industries buy which imports. However, such assumptions 
are not necessarily valid. Specifically, under the homogeneity assumption all firms in the same industry are 
assumed to have the same production function and use the same bundle of inputs. Yet, at the country-indus-
try level, input use varies with output, since firms exporting to different countries and industries participate 
in different value chains and face distinct rules of origin (De Gortari, 2018).   
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in value added, i.e. how to compute direct and total requirements, components of domestic and 
foreign value-added and the length of the GVC.  
Domestic value added (DVA) is decomposed into exports absorbed in the destination country 
and those that are used as intermediate inputs for exports to third countries (forward linkages) 
or returned home. Based on this decomposition, the two measures of GVC participation used 
in this report are: backward linkage, being the share of foreign value-added in total exports of 
a country, and forward linkage, the domestic value-added embodied in intermediate exports 
that are re-exported to third countries, expressed as a ratio of gross exports. See Jones, 
Demirkaya and Bethmann (2019) for a comprehensive review of the analytical tools for GVC 
analysis and Wang, Wei and Zhu, 2013 and Koopman et. al., 2014 for a more technical exami-
nation to the calculation of GVC indicators).  
The foreign value-added content of exports (FVAiX) measures the use of imported inputs to 
produce goods that are exported (see Koopman et al. 2014). This IO based measure of GVC 
focuses on the (direct and indirect) import content of exports by capturing cases where the 
production is carried out in at least two countries and the products cross at least twice the 
international borders. 
The length of GVC indicates the number of stages involved in a value chain. The average prop-
agation length (APL) examines how much domestic and foreign value added is embodied in a 
country’s exports. This measures the relative distance from the most upstream (primary com-
modities) and downstream (final goods) part of the value-chain (see Inomata, 2008). A country 
can be upstream or downstream, depending on its specialisation. In other words, the more the 
length of GVC the more are the stages involved in production unlike larger distance suggesting 
country’s position in the GVC stream i.e. relatively upstream. 
 
3.3 Trade in value added: Evolution and linkages  
Importing for exports is a key feature of GVC trade. This is particularly true in the case of 
manufactures. In other words, the higher the share of the manufacturing sector in a country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP), the lower is the share of DVA in its exports. Another important 
structural factor is the market size. Countries with larger markets are expected to have higher 
share of DVA in exports since they rely on a wider array of domestic intermediates, both in 
terms of purchases and sales (OECD, 2015). Time is another factor: the rise of GVC trade, 
sometimes called “hyper-globalization” took place between 1995 and 2005 (Escaith and 
Miroudot, 2015). The process slowed down during the 2008-2009 global crisis with post 2008 
showing some stagnation and even a shortening of the value-chain, albeit there is a debate on 
the source and extent of this trend. The IDE-JETRO report (2017) finds that complex GVCs 
have continued to expand, and recent research by Gaulier, Sztulman and Ünal (2019) confirms 
that the process is still ongoing.  
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This section examines the evolution of Commonwealth countries trade in value-added from 
1995 to 2018. This considers the use of FVAiX on the one hand, and the exports of DVA to 
other trading partners for further reprocessing and exports on the other.  
3.3.1 GVC participation index: 1995-2018 
The index, based on UNCTAD-EORA data, is calculated over the entire economy, including 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.  The index, based on UNCTAD-EORA data, is calcu-
lated over the entire economy, including primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.  
 
Figure 1 presents the GVC participation index for top 20 Commonwealth countries that pre-
sent evidence of participation in 2015, the last year with detailed EORA data. The index is 
traditionally measured as the foreign value added embodied in production (usually only ex-
ports) plus DVA used by other industries in foreign countries to produce exports.5 The index, 
based on UNCTAD-EORA data, is calculated over the entire economy, including primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors.  
 
Figure 1 : GVC participation index: Top 20 Commonwealth countries, 2015 (as %  of exports) 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on EORA  
An examination of countries’ participation in GVCs, in terms of domestic and foreign value-
added content of gross exports by the exporting country, shows that open economies, such as 
Singapore, Cyprus and Malaysia present evidence of high backward participation. The UK, 
Malta and South Africa show high forward linkage. The UK is a large exporter of business and 
 
5 The participation indicator is based on nominal trade value and is influenced by variation in international 
prices, especially for trade in commodities. 
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financial services that are used as intermediate inputs in GVCs. South Africa exhibits high 
value of forward linkage, reflecting the fact that South African exports are used as inputs by 
other countries.  
Figure 2 disaggregates the long-term evolution of Commonwealth member countries’ partici-
pation in the GVCs. An important finding is that majority of Commonwealth countries in-
creased their reliance on inputs from other Commonwealth trade partners during 1995-2018. 
The median value, for all Commonwealth countries, increased by more than 1 percentage 
point, from 4.4% to 5.7%. The average, however, increased by half a percentage point, from 
6.4% to 6.9%. 
Figure 2 Participation index of Commonwealth countries in GVCs, 1995-2018 (Percent of ex-
ports, sum of forward and backward linkages) 
 
Note: Regional indicators based on a simple average of individual countries indices. 
Source: Authors calculations based on UNCTAD-EORA  
 
The Asian, Pacific and European regions present evidence of growing participation in GVCs. 
Asia stands out with the highest growth in GVC integration between Commonwealth mem-
bers. This, however, does not apply to Africa and the Caribbean regions that did not show 
much changes in their GVC integration. Nevertheless, while Africa shows high insertion, the 
Caribbean countries are at the lowest part of the spectrum.    
3.3.2 Backward and Forward linkages: 1995-2018 
Disaggregating the linkages by backward (imports of inputs) and forward (export of interme-
diate goods) reveals that the Asian and Pacific countries increased their reliance on imported 
inputs (i.e. backward linkage) by 22% and 16%, respectively and exports of intermediate goods 
increased (i.e. forward linkage) by 10% and 22%, respectively between 1995 and 2018. 
The countries in Europe that belong to the Commonwealth –UK, Malta and Cyprus– are highly 
integrated in the GVCs due to these countries being a part of the EU single market. Actually, 
it appears that membership into the same deep integration agreement potentialize the positive 
impact of Commonwealth membership. This explains why Malta and Cyprus registered a 
higher forward linkage increase (20%) then the backward linkage (5%).  
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The Caribbean and Americas present a mixed picture – increasing backward linkage (22%) 
but falling forward linkage (12%). Countries in Africa exhibit a relatively constant participa-
tion in both the forward and backward linkage (1% increase in backward and 2% drop in the 
forward linkage). When the whole economy is considered, Africa shows a high incidence of 
backward linkages, despite its comparative advantages in forward-type exports of commodi-
ties. The backward index, calculated as a simple average of countries indices, is particularly 
affected by the high values found for Botswana and Namibia (over 23 in 1995 and about 20 in 
2018) and Mauritius (11 and 12, respectively). Actually, the Africa region is the most hetero-
geneous with regard to this indicator, with a standard variation of the backward index almost 
as high than the mean value (8.0 against 8.9 in 1995). For comparison, the standard deviation 
is 3.1 in Asia, 2.2 in the Pacific and only 0.5 in Europe.  
Figure 3: Backward (imports of inputs) and Forward (exports of inputs) linkages with other 
CW countries, 1995-2018 (percent of exports) 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on UNCTAD-EORA  
When it comes to sourcing domestic and imported inputs, the Commonwealth countries pre-
sent different patterns, even when they are located in the same geographical regions. To ex-
amine the evolution of Commonwealth countries’ GVCs, we apply the exploratory data analy-
sis to a set of GVC variables.6 The results obtained with Agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
(AHC)7 show the similarities and dissimilarities between countries in both the depth of their 
GVC integration in 2015 and its evolution from 1995 to 2018.  
 
6 The variables used include the source of value-added used in producing exports in 2015: Domestic value-
added; imported from other Commonwealth countries; imported from other G20 members and imported from 
Rest of the World. The imports from other G20 countries are aimed at capturing the impact of deep free 
trade agreements in North America and Europe as well as the emergence of large developing countries (such 
as China, in particular). The value for 2015 is complemented by the extent of variation every 5 years from 
1995 to 2018 (this is 3 years for 2015-2018).   
7 Agglomerative clustering is the most common type of hierarchical clustering used to group objects in clus-
ters based on their similarity. The algorithm starts by treating each object as a singleton cluster. Next, pairs 
of clusters are successively merged until all clusters have been merged into one big cluster containing all ob-
jects.  
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3.3.2.1  Similarities in Backward Linkages  
Table 1 provides an overview on the level of Commonwealth countries’ backward linkage in 
the GVCs.  
 
Table 1 Country clusters based on the evolution of origin of value-added exports:1995-2018 
Clusters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Within-cluster 
variance 272.8 41.9 411.7 246.3 294.2 231.0 742.9 0.0 
DVA_2015 69.3 88.4 74.0 78.7 73.4 58.3 63.0 87.2 
CWS_2015 7.8 4.2 4.3 15.6 12.5 13.1 7.7 8.0 
G20_2015 15.5 5.0 15.8 3.2 6.7 18.5 13.0 2.4 
Var. DVA_95_18 9.9 -0.3 2.7 5.7 -0.4 -25.3 -8.3 6.6 
Var. CW_95_18 -0.5 0.6 0.6 -4.2 0.5 8.9 1.7 -4.3 
Var. G20_95_18 -6.6 -0.1 -3.2 -0.7 -0.3 10.1 3.2 -1.0 
Countries Antigua Australia Bahamas Botswana Fiji Guyana Lesotho Zambia 
 Malaysia Bangladesh Barbados Mozambique Gambia Tanzania Rwanda  
 Mauritius Cameroon Belize Namibia Seychelles    




  India Canada  Swaziland    
  Kenya Cyprus  Vanuatu    
  Malawi Jamaica      
  New Zealand Malta      
  Pakistan Nigeria      
 
 Papua New 
Guinea Singapore 












     
   UK      
Notes:  Based on Agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC).  
DVA_2015: share of domestic value added in exports in 2015;  
CWS_2015: share of value-added imported from other Commonwealth countries;  
G20_2015: share of value-added imported from non- Commonwealth G20 countries.  
Imports from the Rest of World are calculated from 100%.  
Source: Authors elaboration, based on UNCTAD-EORA data 
 
Some interesting observations emerge:  
• Large economies do not rely on the Commonwealth member countries for their in-
puts. Countries, such as Australia, India, Kenya, New Zealand exhibit a high domes-
tic value added in exports. An explanation is the domestic market size of these coun-
tries that provides a large pool of local input suppliers which lowers their backward 
GVC participation but increases forward GVC participation. 
• Open economies import value-added inputs from G-20 countries, and the reliance of 
countries such as Singapore and UK on the Commonwealth countries is lower (4.2%) 
than the group average.  
• Small economies show some evidence of more inward orientation. Countries, such as 
Guyana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Swaziland, rely on imported inputs from the Com-
monwealth countries with value of inputs ranging from 13% to 16%.  
3.3.2.2 Similarities in Forward Linkages 
Forward linkages show the destination of DVA embodied in the Commonwealth countries in-
termediate inputs used by other countries to produce exports. Thus, the concept of forward 
Background Commonwealth GVC paper: Final draft 
14 
 
linkage includes the DVA embodied in intermediate exports further re-exported to third coun-
tries, expressed as a ratio of gross exports. 
 
Table 2 Country clusters based on the evolution of domestic value-added for intermediate 
goods exports: 1995-2018 








Domestic_2015 72.8 76.6 75.5 77.1 72 
CW exports_2015 4.3 5.3 3.9 3.8 6.6 
G20 exports_2015 14.1 8.5 7.8 7.1 13.1 
d_Dom_95_18 -5.9 -2.8 2.1 -0.7 1.2 
d_CWS_95_18 0.6 0.4 -0.9 1.4 0.3 
d_G20_95_18 4.3 1.6 0.5 -1.3 0 
Countries Antigua Australia Barbados Vanuatu Zambia 
 Bahamas Bangladesh Botswana   
 Brunei Belize Gambia   
 Cameroon Cyprus Ghana   
 Canada Fiji Jamaica   
 Malaysia Guyana Lesotho   
 Malta India Namibia   
 Nigeria Kenya Rwanda   
 Pakistan Malawi Sierra Leone   
 Papua New Guinea Mauritius Swaziland   
 South Africa Mozambique Uganda   
 Trinidad and Tobago New Zealand    
 UK Samoa    
  Seychelles    
  Singapore    
  Sri Lanka    
  Tanzania    
Notes: Domestic_2015: share of domestic value added sold locally and embodied in exports in 2015; 
CWS_2015: share of value-added exported to other Commonwealth countries for re-exports; G20 exports: 
G20_2015: share of value-added imported from non- Commonwealth G20 countries. Imports from the Rest of 
World are calculated from 100%.  
Source: Authors elaboration, based on UNCTAD-EORA data 
From GVC perspective, the reliance of Commonwealth countries on domestic inputs increased 
between 1995-2018. Findings worth highlighting are as below:  
• Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, UK, Malaysia, South Africa, are more up-
stream in GVCs with higher forward linkages. These countries source intermediate 
inputs from the G20 countries; this was 14% more in 2015 compared to 1995 represent-
ing an increase of 4 percentage points over the period.  
• Countries in Asia and the Pacific, such Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand rely on domestic rely more on domestic value-added and ex-
ports from the Commonwealth members. These present limited evidence of forward 
linkages with the Commonwealth and G-20 countries. 
• Ghana, Jamaica, Namibia and Swaziland are inward-looking and inwardly-oriented 
countries, in terms of their reliance on Commonwealth and G20 exports.  
Figure 4 presents GVC linkages for the Commonwealth countries, constructed as the sum of 
backward and forward linkages for 1995-2018.  
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Figure 4 GVC Linkages within the Commonwealth community, 1995-2018 
 
 
Note: CWS_2015: sum of the backward and forward linkages, in percent of respective imports and exports of 
intermediate products;  
d_CWS_95_18: weighted sum of respective variations of imports and exports between 1995 and 2018.  
Dotted lines indicate the median value for both concepts.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on UNCTAD-EORA data 
Most countries in the top right quadrant (high and increasing) are small and open countries 
unlike the larger Commonwealth countries that have a stagnant rate of GVC integration with 
other Commonwealth partners. Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia substitute part of their 
imports from the Commonwealth for domestic inputs unlike Jamaica with low and declining 
GVC participation whereas Namibia and Swaziland with an inward orientation.  
3.4 A closer look at the intra-industry trade networks: 2015 
We use the tools of Social Network Analysis to visualise the strength of bilateral inter-indus-
trial linkages, of primary and intermediate inputs, for the Commonwealth countries in relation 
to non-Commonwealth countries. The analysis is for year 2015; this is the latest data available 
in Eora.  
In the network analysis, each country is represented by a node (a circle or a square), with 
arrows pointing from supplier to receiver of inputs used by the using industry to produce ex-
ports. The methodology used to draw the network analysis (the Fruchterman-Reingold algo-
rithm8) places the most important nodes (i.e. countries) in the centre. The size of an economy 
interacts with its level of integration in the GVCs to establish its importance within the net-
work. In this analysis, a force-directed layout algorithm is typically used to determine the 
 
8 The Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm is a force-directed layout algorithm. The idea of a force directed lay-
out algorithm is to consider a force between any two nodes. In this algorithm, the nodes are represented by 
steel rings and the edges are springs between them. 
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location of the nodes in the network visualisation. The position of the nodes takes into consid-
eration the relative importance of countries in the network. The size of each node is propor-
tional to its total degree (sum of indegree and outdegree) and the colour of the node is mapped 
to its indegree, with darker shades indicating higher values.  
The larger countries are generally located in the centre of the network, primarily due to the 
fact that they are important suppliers of intermediate goods. Smaller economies are mainly on 
the periphery of the network suggesting that these economies are placed in intermediate 
stages of the GVC and act as intermediaries either at the beginning of the chain (e.g. focused 
on R&D and engineering or raw materials) or in the final stages (as assembling facilities). Note 
that some small countries have darker nodes in the graph as they use inputs from several 
sources, signalling a strong integration in the network. 
The Commonwealth countries are of varying sizes, and it would be misleading to use actual 
trade flows for the analysis because smaller countries would be overshadowed by the large 
ones. To address this bias, the analysis uses trade flows expressed in terms of percentage of 
each country’s direct requirements exports, and only the most significant bilateral trade flows 
have been used.  
3.4.1 Trade in primary goods  
Figure 5 Intra-Industrial trade flows in intermediate inputs produced by the primary sector, 
2015 
 
Note: Intra-regional trade only. Nodes are labelled according to the ISO3 country code; the size of the fonts 
indicates the centrality role of the country in the network.  Arrows (edges) are sized according to their 
weight in the importers’ foreign direct requirements.  
Source: Authors, based on processed Eora data and the Gephi package.  
In 2015, the countries placed in the main core are the large Commonwealth countries, like UK, 
Australia and South Africa, at the centre of the network. The increase in the density of the 
network places UK in a central position given its economic size and trade in primary goods 
with the geographically diverse Commonwealth community. South Africa is a key trade part-
ner for African countries, as India is for Asia (e.g. Sri Lanka, Pakistan). On the periphery are 
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countries in the Caribbean and Africa, given countries like Botswana, Swaziland, Jamaica and 
Guyana are raw materials suppliers providing inputs at the beginning of the GVC to other 
countries in the region. 
3.4.2 Trade in intermediates or manufactured inputs 
Trade in intermediates or manufactured inputs (Figure 6) reflects the economic size of export-
ing country and its role in the intermediate stages of the GVC.  
Figure 6 Intra-Industrial trade flows in manufactured inputs produced by the secondary sec-
tor, 2015 
 
Note: Intra-regional trade only. Nodes are labelled according to the ISO3 country code. The size of the fonts 
indicates the centrality role of the country in the network.  Arrows (edges) are sized according to their 
weight (from importer’s perspective).  
Source: Authors, based on processed Eora data and the Gephi package.  
South Africa dominates the regional network given it enjoys strong links with the African 
countries, like Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, located in the outer layers of the network. South 
Africa is an important source of processed inputs for Commonwealth countries members in the 
region, but its location at the periphery of the network shows that it is not a major global 
supplier. 
UK’s trade of value-added with the Commonwealth countries like Malta, Cyprus and Canada 
makes it important in the network. The Asian economies are located on the secondary edge. 
For instance, India, Australia and Singapore supply value added inputs to Bangladesh, New 
Zealand and Malaysia, respectively. 
The analysis highlights the regional dimension of Commonwealth GVCs in sourcing inputs. 
Main findings are as below:  
• Large economies play a vital role as hubs but countries, such as the UK and Canada, 
source less than 7% of manufacturing inputs from other Commonwealth members. 
Considering large industrialised Commonwealth economies produce complex 
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intermediate inputs the lack of linkage with smaller Commonwealth countries  is not 
surprising.  
• Membership of preferential trade agreements and the depth of such agreements in-
crease backward GVC participation. Canada’s backward linkage is explained by its 
economic integration with the USA and Mexico under NAFTA.  
• Commonwealth countries in the African region show evidence of regional interlinkages. 
There are two prominent regional clusters - Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zambia; Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and Tanzania. In addition, 
African countries source over 70% of foreign input requirements from a regional Com-
monwealth partner. South Africa that holds a prominent position, both as a major sup-
plier of primary and secondary inputs in African GVCs. The Pacific countries are also 
grouped by geographical characteristics in a cluster comprising Fiji, New Zealand, and 
Papua New Guinea.  
• Regional characteristics are, however, not the sole determinants of GVC trade in man-
ufactured inputs. Countries from different geographical location, such as Cyprus, Gam-
bia, Lesotho, Malta, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, UK share sim-
ilar sourcing patterns. 
 
3.5  Length of GVCs in 2015 
The measurement of GVC production length calculating two metrics: “distance to final de-
mand,” or “upstreamness” i.e., the average number of stages between production and final 
consumption, and “the average number of production stages embodied in each product” or the 
“downstreamness”. The calculation provides a measure of the total length of production chains 
and a sector’s position in the chain simultaneously. There are several methodological ap-
proaches; this report uses the Average Propagation Length (Inomata, 2008; Escaith and Ino-
mata, 2013).  9 The calculation of APL considers direct and indirect trade flows required for 
the production of final goods and consider where countries are located in the value chain.  Cal-
culation is based on total requirements, including the various steps and back and forth link-
ages required for producing a final product. Intuitively, the more strategically an industry is 
inserted into a value-chain, the more often it will be required to supply inputs to other GVC. 
This is in contrast to the network analysis, that measures bilateral trade flows with traditional 
trade and national accounts statistics. The more inserted an industry into GVCs, the higher 
will be the difference between the value of exports from direct connection with the producing 
industry, and exports it is able to realise through inter-industrial network.  
The nature of intermediate goods influences APL: commodities tend to travel longer in the 
value-chain, as the value-added is embodied in processed goods used further down the supply 
chain.  However, only a small proportion of primary goods are produced for final demand 
 
9 The APL approach has the merit of being closely associated with the concepts of backward and forward 
linkages used in traditional Input-Output analysis. Annex I presents the methodology used to estimate APL. 
There are other approaches, see for example, Fally (2012), Antras et al. (2012) and Antras and Chor (2013). 
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(mainly agricultural and fishery products). Hence, upstreamness is often associated with spe-
cialisation in primary exports, with some exceptions.10  
The nature of a business model also affects the location of the firm in the GVC: in a less inte-
grated country there is little outsourcing and most tasks are done internally. As a result, the 
corresponding backward linkages are reduced. Modern business models, on the contrary, ex-
ploit the value-chain opportunities and present higher inter-industry interactions and longer 
domestic and foreign value-chains. 
With these caveats in mind, Figure 7 presents the length and relative upstreamness of the 
Commonwealth countries’ primary and secondary sector. The measure of “upstreamness” re-
fers to the “distance to final demand”. The index measures how many stages of production 
remain before goods produced reach final consumers. This is a calculation based on the inter-
country IO framework used to derive the GVC indicators.  
The average value by country (for all industries) is presented below in Figure 7 for selected 
countries. A high value of upstreamness is associated with the finding that countries are more 
specialised in the production of inputs at the beginning of the value chain, such as Namibia 
and Brunei as these are exporters of primary goods. On the contrary, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Brunei lead in the secondary sector as main exporters of secondary products, for products like 
refined fuels.  
When calculating the length of backward and forward indices, it is possible to separate the 
influence of the foreign value chain from the domestic interactions. This calculation is partic-
ularly interesting when the objective is to look at the strength of international linkages as an 
indicator of the outward orientation of an industry, as it is the case here. 
Figure 8 (below) presents the results for a selection of primary and secondary sectors, calcu-
lated for the Commonwealth community. The GVC profile of countries across different indus-
try sectors are heterogeneous. The total length of the value chain, both domestic and foreign 
components, varies from 3 (for Metal products) to 1.6 (for Food and beverage). Textile industry 
sector is twice as much international than agriculture, when looking at the relative importance 








10 For example, a manufacture industry in an advanced country may specialise in upstream activities, such 
as R&D, and outsource the manufacturing operations to low-cost countries. In this particular case, up-
streamness is associated with high technological content. 
Background Commonwealth GVC paper: Final draft 
20 
 
Figure 7 GVC length and relative upstreamness of CW countries’ primary and secondary sec-
tors, 2015 
 
Note: Average propagation length are calculated for each individual industry as weighted average of the suc-
cessive value-chain steps, covering both domestic and foreign linkages. The sectoral aggregates are simple 
average of the industries belonging to the primary and the secondary sectors. Forward APL is based on the 
Ghosh matrix and backward linkages are calculated from the Leontief table. 
Source: Authors estimates based on Eora data 
The longest value chain (Figure 8 below), by Commonwealth countries average, is observed for 
Metal Products industry. Both domestic (3.6) and foreign (3.0) segments are very long. Mining 
and quarrying industry has a similar profile, with longer foreign linkages and a shorter do-
mestic linkage (3.3). The Petroleum and Chemical sector has more compact value chains with 
domestic (3.0) and foreign (2.6) linkage components. All in all, the GVC profiles of relatively 
unprocessed products that are used as intermediate inputs by other industries are relatively 
similar. 
 
Background Commonwealth GVC paper: Final draft 
21 
 
Figure 8 Domestic and Foreign segments of industry sectors in the Commonwealth value-
chain, 2015 
 
Note: The lengths of the forward and backward linkages are simple averages of Commonwealth countries 
calculated using the APL method. 
Source: Authors’ based on EORA data 
The second group of industries, i.e. processed products are closer to the final demand, with 
smaller overall linkages, in particular for domestic part (about 2.2). Within this group, 
transport equipment and electrical and electronics are the most integrated with partners out-
side the Commonwealth, with foreign linkages measured at 2.4 and 2.3, respectively as an 
average for all CW countries. Other manufactures are 2.8 and 2.0 for forward and backward 
linkages, respectively.  
The domestic length of the Textile industry is the shortest among all reported industry sectors, 
at 1.9. This presents short domestic linkages compared to the foreign linkages.  
Agriculture and Food and beverage industry sector is characterised by larger domestic link-
ages (about 2.0) than the foreign (about 1.7). With few exceptions (especially Canada or New 
Zealand for agriculture), these two sectors remain inward oriented.  
However, upstreamness tells only a part of the story in GVC analysis: primary sectors such as 
Agriculture, and Mining and Quarrying are both upstream with forward linkages to down-
stream industries largely dominating the GVC length.  Yet, mineral products are much more 
internationally tradable than agricultural products, with long forward linkages. 
As far as the inward and outward orientation is concerned, we find a contrast between coun-
tries. We would expect smaller countries to be more reliant on foreign markets, as it is the case 
with Mauritius and Singapore which are foreign-oriented. But this is not the case with Ja-
maica and New Zealand that show less outward orientation when compared to the UK, South 
Africa and Canada. However, large economies such as Australia and India, are highly reliant 
on domestic value-added and are inward-oriented in the sub-sample. 
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The upstreamness ratio is affected by the length of backward linkages when it is very small, 
and can be misleading. Hence, when interpreting sectoral GVC indices, it is important to dif-
ferentiate the nature of backward and forward indicators.  
Forward linkages deal with the sales of a single output, produced by the industry of interest. 
This output, nevertheless, is used by different industries from primary to tertiary sectors, ei-
ther directly or embodied into other intermediate goods. Backward linkages include all pur-
chases of inputs required for production, whether direct or indirect and includes all inputs (i.e. 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors). For example, Singapore’s agricultural sector shows 
relatively strong domestic backward linkages, but this should not be interpreted as an indica-
tor of strong reliance on domestic agricultural inputs but as the contribution of secondary and 
tertiary sectors (for example, wholesale distribution of imported inputs).11 The strong back-
ward linkage (and weak domestic forward linkages to domestic final demand) is attributed to 
Singapore’s re-exports of agricultural products.  
Further examination of agricultural sector linkages for Canada and New Zealand presents 
evidence of significant comparative advantages, extending to strong backward linkages for 
their food and beverage industry. It contrasts with Singapore that does not rely on domestic 
inputs for its food industry sector. Indian agriculture APL is small (i.e. low rank of agricultural 
linkage) due to inward orientation, both in the use of inputs and lack of export orientation. 
Kenya agricultural sector, however, shows strong export orientation (e.g. tea, flowers).  
For Mining and Quarrying sector, Jamaica and Kenya show long APL mainly due to large 
domestic forward linkages. But strong comparative advantages is not always correlated with 
long APL and GVC linkages. For example, Saudi Arabia and South Africa exhibit short back-
ward domestic linkages, while Singapore ranks fourth.  Developing an industry from huge 
domestic resources leads to short backward domestic linkages because firms undertake the 
tasks for extraction and initial processing of raw materials internally. The Saudi case is illus-
trative and most output is by its domestic Petro-Chemical industry rather than being exported 
for processing.  
Again, the length of GVCs do not always correlate with a country’s competitive advantage in 
processing raw inputs. Singapore, as a regional hub, ranks first with long APL in Petroleum, 
chemicals and non-metallic mineral products. But Saudi Arabia is at the bottom end.  Metal 
products sector is another similar example - Trinidad and Tobago, is rich in oil but not in other 






11 The strength of backward linkages in agriculture is often linked to modern agriculture, reliant on im-
proved seeds and intensive in fertilizers and other chemical inputs. 
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Figure 9 Domestic and foreign linkages for selected industries and countries, 2015 
 
Note: The suffix “_BD” refers to the length of Backward Domestic linkages, as simple average of selected 
countries’ indicator; “_FD”: forward domestic linkages; “_FF”: forward foreign linkages; “_BF”: backward for-
eign linkages  
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Textiles, Electric and electronic products, Transport equipment and Other manufacture sec-
tors are closely associated with the GVC business model. The degree and diversity of pro-
cessing offers large potential for domestic and foreign outsourcing. Most end-products are com-
mercialised by lead firms which have sophisticated supply-chain arrangements. Trinidad and 
Tobago has the longest value-chain for all sectors, followed by Tanzania. While Trinidad and 
Tobago has a strong domestic sector reliance, Tanzania shows strong foreign sector reliance in 
light of its reliance on imported inputs.  
Despite the UK being a leader with strong presence in Transport equipment sector (in partic-
ular the aeronautical and land transport equipment industry) it does not dominate the sector. 
This is indicative of the fact that GVC indices have little to do with the comparative advantage 
of a country. When trading under GVCs developing a domestic industry does not necessarily 
depend on existing “natural” advantages that can be attributed to natural resources, technol-
ogy or labour endowments. In fact, an industry that relies on geographically diversified mar-
kets for inputs and outputs, is likely to insert itself into deep inter-industry relationship.  
Despite the popularity of upstreamness and downstreamness concepts in GVC analysis, the 
upstreamness index results can be misleading. It is based on ratio between the length of for-
ward and backward linkages, such that a small backward linkage value can induce high up-
stream indicators even when the actual forward linkages are not large. With these caveats in 
mind, Table 3 presents an overview on the top and bottom ten Commonwealth countries for 
primary and secondary sectors. 
 
Table 3 Upstreamness: Top 10 and bottom countries for primary and secondary sectors. 2015 
Top 10 Primary sector  Bottom 10 Secondary sector 
Country BackAPL ForwAPL Upstreamness Country BackAPL ForwAPL Upstreamness 
Seychelles 0.6 3.2 5.8  Botswana 2.8 1.0 0.4 
Mauritius 0.9 5.0 5.7  Bahamas 2.6 1.0 0.4 
Ghana 0.7 3.0 4.2  Sierra Leone 3.5 1.5 0.4 
Fiji 0.7 2.7 3.8  Mauritius 2.2 1.0 0.4 
Cameroon 0.9 3.4 3.7  Tanzania 4.4 2.1 0.5 
Gambia 0.9 3.4 3.6  Cyprus 2.9 1.4 0.5 
Papua New Gui-
nea 1.3 4.6 3.6  Lesotho 3.3 1.7 0.5 
Belize 0.7 2.7 3.6  Rwanda 3.5 1.8 0.5 
Saudi Arabia 0.9 3.0 3.4  Antigua 3.9 2.1 0.5 
Barbados 0.8 2.9 3.4  Namibia 2.6 1.4 0.6 
Vanuatu 1.0 3.4 3.3  Guyana 4.2 2.4 0.6 
Pakistan 0.9 2.9 3.1  Uganda 3.1 1.8 0.6 
Zambia 1.1 3.3 3.0  Jamaica 2.8 1.6 0.6 
Mozambique 0.8 2.3 2.9  Swaziland 3.4 2.0 0.6 
Sierra Leone 1.5 4.1 2.8  Barbados 3.2 1.9 0.6 
Samoa 1.2 3.2 2.7  Belize 2.3 1.5 0.7 
Bahamas 1.0 2.6 2.7  Saudi Arabia 2.0 1.3 0.7 
India 1.0 2.6 2.7  Singapore 3.5 2.3 0.7 
Sri Lanka 1.0 2.6 2.7  Malaysia 3.3 2.3 0.7 
Malawi 1.1 2.8 2.6  Fiji 2.9 2.0 0.7 
Source: Source: Authors, based on Eora data 
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Bilateral GVC trade decomposition  
Bilateral GVC decomposition, a work-horse of trade in value-added analysis, examines the 
origin of value-added embodied into the production or the exports of a given industry. The 
calculations are based on exports by the 43 CW countries included in EORA and, considering 
3 aggregated sectors, i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary by type of activity. The first table 
covers only intra-CW trade relationship. Table 4 shows the importance of the GVC link from 
the source industry perspective.  
Table 4 Secondary sector: Top 20 CW bilateral trade flows of domestic value added, 2015 
Source_Country Using_Country a FVAX(USD) FVAX(pct) b 
Malaysia Singapore 11618537 8.61 
Singapore Malaysia 4418026 4.89 
Malta Singapore 72699 3.31 
Zambia South Africa 37657 1.28 
Australia Singapore 2475776 1.07 
Malta Malaysia 22722 1.03 
Barbados UK 4398 0.97 
Trinidad and Tobago Canada 56811 0.94 
South Africa UK 853840 0.87 
Malta UK 18674 0.85 
Jamaica UK 15794 0.81 
New Zealand Australia 421955 0.80 
Papua New Guinea Australia 14312 0.79 
Brunei Singapore 20045 0.75 
Malaysia Singapore 943895 0.70 
UK Singapore 3074410 0.68 
Australia Malaysia 1513618 0.66 
India Singapore 1492423 0.66 
Cyprus UK 20319 0.65 
New Zealand Malaysia 326282 0.62 
Note: a/ All using sectors are also Secondary sectors, except for the last row (Malaysia-Singapore), where the 
uses are made by Singapore’s tertiary sector.  
b/ FVAX(pct): Embodied foreign value-added in exports, percentage of the source industry total value-added.  
Source: Based on Eora data and the “Decompr” R package (Quast and Kummrit, 2015).   
 
The main observations on country’s position in the GVC are as below:  
• Malaysia and Singapore are at top of the list of countries, both as a source and export-
ing countries, with significant foreign value-added contribution.  
• Malta ranks high, as explained by European G20 countries:  France, Germany, Italy or 
UK, supplying Singapore manufacturing sector with inputs.  
• Foreign value-added export value is high for Australia, UK, Singapore. Singapore leads 
possibly due to the position as a maritime hub for re-exports (also called the “Rotterdam 
effect” in trade statistics).   
 The CW community is relatively small in terms of market for Commonwealth 
manufactured value added. If we reconstruct Table 4 with countries other than 
Commonwealth, i.e. other G20 members, the picture is very different (See Table 
5). 17 of the 20 main countries are not Commonwealth members. Among Com-
monwealth countries, only Singapore and Malaysia are in the top20 list of export 
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markets. The results suggest that intra-industry trade is dominant when it 
comes to trade in secondary goods, i.e. manufactures. 
 
Table 5 Secondary sector: Top 20 Commonwealth to Commonwealth and G20 trade flows of 
domestic value added, 2015 
Source_Country Using_Country a FVAX(USD) FVAX(pct) b 
Malaysia Singapore 11618537 8.606911 
Brunei South Korea 148093.3 5.51361 
Singapore Malaysia 4418026 4.886674 
Swaziland South Korea 17604.67 3.844927 
Brunei Japan 98278.64 3.658979 
Malta Singapore 72699.12 3.308675 
Canada USA 14256739 3.08605 
Singapore China 2716324 3.004462 
Malaysia China 3767390 2.79085 
Trinidad and Tobago USA 166606.5 2.762159 
Antigua Germany 1083.294 2.515906 
UK Germany 10327347 2.297049 
Malta Germany 48517.99 2.208146 
Zambia China 54505.07 1.854392 
Jamaica Germany 34325.75 1.766023 
Pakistan China 636632.4 1.753482 
Malta USA 36043.94 1.640428 
Malta Italy 35966.12 1.636886 
Malta China 33310.13 1.516007 
Malaysia Japan 1976076 1.46386 
Note: a/ All using sectors are also Secondary sectors. 
b/ FVAX(pct): Embodied foreign value-added in exports, percentage of the source industry total value-added.  
Source: Based on Eora data and the “Decompr” R package (Quast and Kummrit, 2015).   
 
The GVC export profile of the Commonwealth group of countries’ shows:  
• Firstly, two regional clusters ─in Asia (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and Africa (Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda).  
• Secondly, GVC exports are linked with the level of development ─for example, the clus-
ter consisting of Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and UK, consists 
of relatively advanced industrial exporters, with the exception of Sri Lanka. 
Some CW countries have strong geographical specificities, while others are more geograph-
ically diversified.  Evaluating each bilateral trade flow is a cumbersome task and we applied 
instead an exploratory statistical approach.  
Figure 10 uses Principal Component Analysis to provide a full picture with the decomposition 
algorithm. Results shows that Singapore, Malaysia, Canada and the UK are better inserted in 
GVCs. Australia and India are also important players, but more of an upstream type. A second 
ring of countries (yellow dotted line, figure 8) are also relatively well inserted in an upstream 
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Figure 10 Principal Component Analysis of CWS Manufacture exports, 2015 
 
 




4. Measuring the strength of pure Commonwealth value-
chains  
All GVC trade in value-added indicators for the Commonwealth countries based on the EORA 
input-output matrix include all direct and indirect trade flows and include the segments of the 
value-chains that are located in non-Commonwealth countries. The role of the non-Common-
wealth countries as intermediate between two CW countries can be important especially if 
they are regional hubs – an issue that has not been considered so far. For example, it is possible 
that significant value-added exchange between Cyprus and Malta is through GVC firms in a 
non-Commonwealth country, for example Italy. It is in this context that it becomes imperative 
to identify direct GVC linkages from a regional perspective.  
To measure inter Commonwealth GVC trade transiting through a non-Commonwealth country 
at some stage of the value-chain, the exports of intermediate inputs to non-Commonwealth 
countries was set to 0 in the EORA tables and a Leontief decomposition is recalculated. 12 
Table 6 lists the top-20 country secondary to secondary trade flows, in terms of absolute value, 
and in percentage of previous value-added flows.  
 
12 This technique is known as hypothetical extraction in input-output analysis. 
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Table 6 Trade in Value-Added between Commonwealth secondary sectors transiting through 
Non-Commonwealth countries, 2015 (top 20) 
Top 20 by value  Top 20 by percentage 
Source Using Drop in VAX Drop (%)  Source Using Drop in VAX Drop (%) 
UK Singapore        -764 185  -24.9  Trinidad and Tobago Saudi Arabia           -288  -93.5 
UK Canada        -468 513  -26.4  Brunei Saudi Arabia           -256  -91.8 
Canada Singapore        -401 403  -41.5  Brunei Canada       -2 192  -91.7 
UK Malaysia        -368 811  -28.4  Namibia Saudi Arabia             -56  -91.2 
Malaysia Singapore        -360 689  -3.1  Nigeria Bahamas             -49  -90.3 
Canada UK        -337 405  -27.4  Nigeria Saudi Arabia       -1 113  -89.8 
Australia Singapore        -277 326  -11.2  Brunei India       -1 883  -88.5 
Malaysia UK        -248 488  -30.3  Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago           -110  -88.1 
UK India        -234 415  -22.4  Cameroon Singapore       -1 825  -86.7 
India UK        -217 558  -27.1  Nigeria Guyana             -11  -86.5 
India Singapore        -193 745  -13.0  Nigeria Malaysia       -6 957  -85.9 
Malaysia Canada        -185 676  -50.3  Nigeria Singapore     -19 034  -85.6 
Canada Malaysia        -179 918  -41.5  Nigeria Cyprus             -60  -85.3 
Singapore UK        -167 261  -36.7  Namibia Malaysia           -424  -84.5 
Australia UK        -146 376  -24.5  Cameroon Malaysia       -1 028  -84.4 
Australia Malaysia        -145 680  -9.6  Trinidad and Tobago Malaysia       -2 166  -84.3 
India Canada        -132 342  -24.9  Malaysia Bahamas           -133  -84.1 
Australia Canada        -129 245  -27.9  Pakistan Bangladesh           -229  -84.1 
Singapore Malaysia        -127 021  -2.9  Nigeria Australia           -899  -83.9 
Singapore Canada        -119 163  -62.8  Namibia Singapore           -844  -83.1 
Source: Authors estimates based on Eora data 
As expected, values are low when the source country is a large economy and closely inserted 
into a regional trade agreement with large non-Commonwealth countries. This applies to the 
UK (member of the EU) and Canada (member of NAFTA, as the Canada-Mexico-USA trade 
agreement as called in 2015). The bilateral exchange of value-added between Canada and the 
UK declined by $806 billion showing that nearly 25% of GVC transactions between Canada 
and UK manufacturing sectors transit through a non-Commonwealth country – USA - main 
single destination of exports for both countries. Singapore reimports large Commonwealth 
value-added through non-Commonwealth third countries. So, severing GVC ties with non-
Commonwealth value-chains would deprive Singapore’s manufacturing sector of 37% of its UK 
market.  
However, when the economies are geographically close, the decline is usually smaller in per-
centage terms (e.g., Australia-Singapore; Singapore-Malaysia). As seen in the left panel, some 
bilateral flows almost dry-up. Several Commonwealth countries (namely, Trinidad and To-
bago, Brunei, Namibia and Nigeria) export 90% or more of manufacture value-added to Saudi 
Arabia through non-Commonwealth intermediaries. The highest decline is recorded for du-
plets of geographically distant Commonwealth countries suggesting that complex GVCs in-
volve several steps, in particular when goods transit through large non-Commonwealth coun-
tries.  
The previous table dealt with inter-industrial exchange between industries belonging to the 
same secondary sector, which includes manufacture activities. Value-added transactions be-
tween primary (commodities) and secondary (manufactures) sectors depict the complementary 
nature of upstream and downstream industry.  The primary value-added sector goods that 
transit through a third country may have been transformed into a secondary (or even tertiary) 
sector product even before being imported by the using industry. Thus, what is measured is 
the commodity sector value-added embodied into intermediate inputs imported by secondary 
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sectors, and not the nature of the intermediate input itself. For example, the Canadian primary 
value-added imported by Singaporean manufactures in Table 7 may have been used by another 
Canadian firm before being exported to another manufacturer (possibly USA) to produce pro-
cessed inputs purchased by a Singaporean firm. The percentage decline is larger. As seen in 
the left panel, Singapore imports a large share of the Commonwealth primary value-added 
inputs that transit through non-Commonwealth countries. However, after considering the size 
of both source and use economy as well as the historical and economic ties, results show that 
more than 40% of UK’s use of Australian and Canadian primary value-added is processed in a 
non-Commonwealth country. When looking at the right-hand side panel, the picture is strik-
ingly different - all bilateral flows in the Top-20 list are practically reduced to 0; the drop is on 
average 25% lower for all bilateral transactions analysed (1892).   
Table 7 Trade in Value-Added sourced from the Commonwealth (primary and used by Com-
monwealth secondary sectors) transiting through non-Commonwealth countries, 2015 (top 20 
countries) 
















Canada Singapore        -544 346  -84.6  Trinidad and Tobago Singapore     -70 946  -99.9 
Australia Singapore        -294 401  -37.1  Trinidad and Tobago Saudi Arabia       -2 211  -99.8 
Saudi Arabia Singapore        -279 261  -95.2  Trinidad and Tobago Malaysia     -16 282  -99.8 
Malaysia Singapore        -254 062  -18.2  Brunei Saudi Arabia           -378  -99.5 
Canada UK        -232 894  -41.5  Trinidad and Tobago India       -8 006  -99.5 
Australia Malaysia        -208 215  -28.2  Brunei Canada       -3 196  -99.5 
Saudi Arabia UK        -203 792  -96.7  Trinidad and Tobago Nigeria           -106  -99.2 
India UK        -193 572  -35.4  Trinidad and Tobago Australia       -2 620  -98.9 
UK Singapore        -176 686  -39.6  Saudi Arabia Bahamas           -234  -98.9 
Canada Malaysia        -175 407  -73.4  Brunei India       -2 783  -98.8 
India Singapore        -164 123  -22.1  Saudi Arabia 
Trinidad and To-
bago           -905  -98.7 
Australia UK        -149 939  -44.1  Saudi Arabia Cyprus           -788  -98.6 
Saudi Arabia Canada        -124 266  -74.6  Brunei UK       -4 156  -98.6 
Australia Canada        -122 958  -51.0  Nigeria Bahamas           -193  -98.5 
Saudi Arabia Malaysia        -122 024  -73.8  Saudi Arabia Malta       -1 194  -98.5 
Nigeria Singapore        -111 090  -98.4  Nigeria Singapore   -111 090  -98.4 
India Canada           -97 264  -26.1  Saudi Arabia Jamaica           -297  -98.4 
India Malaysia           -95 115  -15.6  Saudi Arabia Pakistan       -1 815  -98.4 
Nigeria UK           -87 400  -66.9  Saudi Arabia Cameroon           -197  -98.1 
UK Canada           -86 204  -19.0  Brunei Malaysia       -6 510  -98.0 
Source: Authors estimates based on Eora data 
 
A final comment on the tables is the absence of CW LDCs as source of primary or secondary 
value-added. LDCs benefit from preferential market access granted under the WTO agree-
ments by developed countries and by an increasing number of large developing countries. 
Moreover, inputs from LDCs are often excluded from the rules of origin governing deep re-
gional agreements. These trade preferences are expected to foster GVC participation (Keane, 
2018). Yet, these preferences have not materialised into a stronger GVC role into the CW 
community. It is true that most manufacture oriented LDCs are downstream and export 
mainly finished products (Apparel, in the case of Bangladesh) or rely on services for their ex-
ports (especially tourism for small islands). 
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5. Building on existing Trade Complementarity 
Up to now, the report has analysed the existing trade linkages between the CW members. 
This section will look at the potential for expanding these connexions, in particular from a 
value-chain perspective. To this aim, we rely on two complementary sets of trade indicators: 
Trade Complementarity Indices (TCI) and Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA). TCIs 
try to match the export structure of a country and the import requirements on another in or-
der to find good correlation between bilateral supply and demand. RCA assesses the competi-
tiveness of a given country by comparing its export structure against World trade. Both sets 
of indicators indicate the potential for developing bilateral trade between two countries if the 
demand for imported products of one country matches an efficient export structure from an-
other one.  
More formally, the indicators are defined as follows: 13 
• Trade Complementarity Indices (TCI) 
TCI measures the degree of fit between the exports structure of one country and the import 
requirements of another one. A high degree of complementarity indicates that the two coun-
tries are “natural trading partners”.  
TCIi,j = 100[1- (Σk│(Mki/ Mi) - (Xkj/ Xj)│/2)] 
Where  
Mki  is country i ’s imports of product k; Mi stands for total imports of country i for all 
goods and services; Xkj  is country j ’s exports of product k; Xj stands for total exports 
of country j for all goods and services. The end result is a n by n matrix, with n is the 
number of countries. Sub setting the EORA database to include only Commonwealth 
countries produces a 44 x 44 matrix.  
Intuitively, TCIs can be compared to correlation coefficients: With perfect correlation be-
tween sectoral shares, the index is one hundred; with perfect negative correlation, it is zero. 
At the difference of correlation coefficient, nevertheless, TCIs are not symmetric and a good 
fit between exports of country i and imports of country j may not coincide with a good fit be-
tween imports of country i and exports of country j.  
 
• Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA).  
This index is traditionally calculated as the ratio of product k’s share in country i ’s exports 
to its share in world trade. 14 
 
 
13 For more details, please refer to UNCTAD-WTO (2012). 
14 There are many alternative ways of calculating comparative advantages indices, see Escaith (forthcoming 
2020) for a review. 
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Formally, it reads as:  
RCAki = (Xki  / Xi ) / (Xkw  / Xw ) 
 
Where:  
Xki  is country I ’s exports of product k; Xi stands for total exports of country I for all 
goods and services; Xkw represents the world exports of good k and Xw   is the value of 
total world exports. The calculation creates a list of n*k indicators (44 x 26, when in-
cluding only the Commonwealth countries covered by the EORA database).15 
Intuitively, the index compares country i export structure with the World trade situation. A 
value of the RCA above one in sector) k for country i means that i has a revealed comparative 
advantage in that sector. Figure 11 shows the Top 10 countries for their average TCI in, re-
spectively, the imports and exports of final and intermediate products (goods and services). 
Figure 11 Top 10 Average Complementarity Indices with other Commonwealth countries, 
2015 
Final Products Intermediate Products 
 
Source: Authors, based on EORA data 
There are two ways of interpreting TCIs: identifying, for each exporter, the trade partners 
that have a demand for imports matching its export baskets, or, conversely, starting from the 
 
15 As mentioned previously, the results concerning services sectors are not considered significant, consider-
ing the weakness of domestic and international trade in services data for most countries included in the da-
tabase.  
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demand side and identifying the countries best able to satisfy the demand for imports.  Both 
approaches are valid and should converge to the same conclusions. In addition, the analysis 
can be done for trade in intermediate inputs or for trade in final products. For example, the 
best fit in trade in intermediate products (goods and services) is found between the UK’s ex-
ports and the import demand of Nigeria and Pakistan, with a TCI of 87.6. The best fit for fi-
nal products is between South African exports and Belize’s imports, with a TCI of 88.0.    
Both categories of products share similar characteristics: the distribution of trade comple-
mentarity is much more asymmetric for exports than for imports and best export fits with 
the rest of the CW community are generally the advantage of large economies. In other 
words, import patterns are relatively similar across countries −with small economies are 
more dependents on imports due to their reduced domestic supply− while exports are more 
specialised, with only the largest economies being able to supply the large varieties of prod-
ucts able to satisfy their trade partners’ demand.  
Because our interest is in strengthening GVC linkages, we will focus on the demand from the 
seven GVC hubs that were identified for the CW community: Australia, Canada, India, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, South Africa and the UK. 
Table 8 below presents the TCI results corresponding to these seven hubs considered as im-
porters of final products.  The first observation is that these relatively large economies have 
a good fit between themselves, as seen from the average high values of their export fit with 
the other Commonwealth GVC hubs. With an average TCI of 68.5, UK has the highest aver-
age TCI, followed by Malaysia (67.0). 
Among the smaller CW countries, the highest average TCI is found in Europe (Cyprus and 
Malta): despite their small size, their exports are sufficiently diversified to satisfy a signifi-
cant proportion of the demand emanating from the seven GVC hubs. Swaziland is also 
within the top-10 group, thanks to its good fit with South Africa and UK demand; it shows 
also a significant fit with India (59.8). This fit indicates the existence of an export potential 
for Swaziland, its realization depending on the series of usual trade constraints (tariff and 
non-tariff trade costs; export promotion). Other promising cases are only bilateral: Samoa’s 
exports fitting Australia’s imports with a TCI of 66.9, Sierra Leone and the UK (64.6) and 
Kenya with Malaysia (59.6). 
More important from a GVC perspective is trade complementarity in intermediate products 
(Table 9). While trade in final products involve only two countries (the exporter and the im-
porter), trade in intermediate inputs are part of a production chain that may involve several 
countries at different stages of the production. Evidently, both aspects of trade are closely 
linked, because the objective of trade in intermediate inputs is the production and sale of fi-
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Table 8 Import Complementarity in Final Products with the seven GVC hubs, 2015 
 





Antigua 54.9 39.0 39.6 51.1 37.7 54.6 52.9 47.1 
Australia NA 59.9 57.7 63.4 59.2 68.4 76.6 64.2 
Bahamas 40.4 21.6 30.8 40.5 24.5 39.9 44.9 34.7 
Bangladesh 19.4 15.6 18.4 22.7 21.4 21.7 27.9 21.0 
Barbados 45.6 24.3 35.1 43 26.8 41.9 45.8 37.5 
Belize 42.0 24.4 33.1 44.4 24.1 37.7 41.7 35.3 
Botswana 44.3 33.5 36.2 49.8 37.6 48.5 56.8 43.8 
Brunei 44.3 13.5 26.4 25 16.7 28.9 35.1 27.1 
Cameroon 46.7 30.1 41.2 47.8 31.5 42.2 48.9 41.2 
Canada 29.1 NA 57.1 49.8 67.8 68.4 71.4 57.3 
Cyprus 37.8 61.0 52.8 61.8 65.8 67.6 78.5 60.8 
Fiji 58.0 24.1 29.6 44.5 27.6 37.4 47.3 38.4 
Gambia 48.9 32.3 39.1 53.8 30.8 46.1 51.6 43.2 
Ghana 35.o 24.2 30.4 44.5 26.7 35.7 42.7 34.2 
Guyana 39.5 28.8 32.2 48.4 28.9 39.3 45.7 37.5 
India 32.3 58.7 NA 56.8 62.0 63.0 72.1 57.5 
Jamaica 32.5 22.9 27.0 43.7 26.7 35.1 47.9 33.7 
Kenya 36.1 42.3 46.3 59.6 43.8 51.8 63.4 49.0 
Lesotho 27.0 15.8 20.5 24.0 17.9 25.5 29.6 22.9 
Malawi 38.1 26.2 30.3 44.4 27.5 39.0 48.0 36.2 
Malaysia 39.5 68.6 77.2 NA 80.7 70.8 65.1 67.0 
Malta 44.8 68.5 65.6 53.1 71.8 79.7 81.5 66.4 
Mauritius 31.4 28.0 27.4 38.9 29.8 35.6 46.5 33.9 
Mozambique 41.5 30.8 39.1 51.6 30.5 43.1 47.0 40.5 
Namibia 34.2 42.6 38.1 54.4 48.6 50.6 60.1 46.9 
New Zealand 48.0 37.6 34.7 53.1 33.2 42.3 44.7 41.9 
Nigeria 38.5 22.7 37.6 51.9 23.7 39.4 39.0 36.1 
Pakistan 26.8 27.0 25.2 32.5 33.4 29.8 39.4 30.6 
Papua New Guinea 59.5 14.5 23.4 34.2 16.7 29.4 33.1 30.1 
Rwanda 49.2 22.7 34.4 40.2 21.7 36.2 39.2 34.8 
Samoa 66.9 18.3 28.0 30.8 18.1 34.8 34.3 33.0 
Saudi Arabia 39.7 16.5 35.4 42.3 18.9 35.9 35.4 32.0 
Seychelles 41.9 21.3 28.5 38.8 22.7 37.5 41.2 33.1 
Sierra Leone 54.5 43.4 45.3 57.0 43.9 52.5 64.6 51.6 
Singapore 42.8 62.5 78.6 50.5 NA 70.1 58.1 60.4 
South Africa 45.1 68.9 62.7 71.1 69.1 NA 80.3 66.2 
Sri Lanka 26.3 31.3 30.7 40.4 39.5 34.8 45.7 35.5 
Swaziland 42.3 52.0 59.8 49.7 54.8 65.1 72.7 56.6 
Trinidad & Tobago 46.9 20.3 34.3 42.4 23.5 40.5 39.7 35.4 
Uganda 39.0 27.5 30.0 45.3 28.7 37.2 41.9 35.7 
UK 38.4 79.4 71.7 57.4 76.7 87.1 NA 68.5 
Tanzania 35.2 40.8 33.8 52.3 41.5 40.2 50.2 42.0 
Vanuatu 47.1 23.3 33.2 42.2 23.1 37.9 41.8 35.5 
Zambia 47.9 39.7 46.9 53.5 41.6 53.3 57.4 48.6 
Source: Authors, based on EORA data  
 
The results presented in Table 9 below show a situation rather similar to what was observed 
when analysing the trade complementarity in final products:  the average TCI of Common-
wealth countries with the seven CW GVC hubs is rather mediocre (a fit of 40%, compared to 
about 43% in the case of final products), with the best fits found between the seven hubs 
themselves. Again, within the small economies, it is the exports from Cyprus and Malta that 
best match the GVC hubs requirements, followed by Swaziland. Other highlightable cases 
are purely bilateral: Mauritius with Australia and New Zealand with Canada.   
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Table 9 Import Complementarity in Intermediate Inputs with the seven GVC hubs, 2015 
 
Australia Canada India Malaysia Singapore South 
Africa 
UK Average 
Antigua 43.6 44.0 29.7 38.9 32.4 54.9 41.2 40.7 
Australia NA 58.6 55.5 62.6 48.9 50.4 56.9 55.5 
Bahamas 33.4 37.7 33.9 38.7 33.5 42.9 38.9 37.0 
Bangladesh 29.1 24.4 19.4 27.8 23.4 34.2 28.0 26.6 
Barbados 38.4 46.4 43.6 51.6 45.2 56.8 50.6 47.5 
Belize 38.2 30.9 26.9 36.0 28.1 40.5 34.7 33.6 
Botswana 36.4 35.9 31.9 35.2 30.2 42.2 36.0 35.4 
Brunei 15.2 15.4 16.4 12.8 11.7 15.3 13.3 14.3 
Cameroon 28.0 26.3 25.2 26.6 19.6 27.8 28.2 26.0 
Canada 31.2 NA 60.5 63.9 52.5 66.9 71.7 57.8 
Cyprus 37.0 66.7 53.7 66.8 55.0 72.9 69.4 60.2 
Fiji 37.5 26.4 22.0 29.7 22.3 29.5 31.4 28.4 
Gambia 41.1 35.1 34.2 37.8 31.1 41.3 41.5 37.4 
Ghana 27.7 28.3 26.4 28.6 20.8 27.6 31.1 27.2 
Guyana 35.3 36.1 34.1 36.4 27.7 34.2 37.9 34.5 
India 32.1 60.0 NA 65.7 59.5 62.0 62.2 56.9 
Jamaica 37.9 36.2 46.5 46.5 32.2 43.1 37.8 40.0 
Kenya 32.1 47.1 44.3 48.2 39.2 48.5 49.4 44.1 
Lesotho 39.3 31.0 32.3 29.0 26.8 42.9 34.3 33.7 
Malawi 29.9 25.2 21.4 28.5 22.1 31.3 28.6 26.7 
Malaysia 38.2 71.4 52.8 NA 79.1 58.0 71.0 61.8 
Malta 37.1 58.8 36.9 62.4 75.1 55.3 59.0 54.9 
Mauritius 56.1 50.1 30.8 45.1 37.3 40.2 45.5 43.6 
Mozambique 37.5 41.3 38.3 42.5 33.3 46.7 43.1 40.4 
Namibia 35.2 48.6 45.9 51.2 42.9 51.4 51.3 46.6 
New Zealand 48.5 55.0 38.6 51.6 41.8 43.5 54.8 47.7 
Nigeria 19.7 21.2 22.3 20.1 17.5 21.6 19.9 20.3 
Pakistan 23.7 26.1 22.4 27.3 20.9 26.4 28.0 25.0 
Papua New Guinea 36.5 22.8 20.5 23.7 16.9 23.3 24.9 24.1 
Rwanda 37.2 32.0 32.0 31.1 28.7 34.6 33.0 32.7 
Samoa 48.4 29.1 28.6 33.2 28.7 35.4 34.4 34.0 
Saudi Arabia 22.1 29.9 44.6 33.8 36.9 41.8 32.5 34.5 
Seychelles 36.8 30.4 27.1 34.6 30.8 36.0 33.6 32.8 
Sierra Leone 42.0 42.5 38.8 44.7 36.4 51.8 46.4 43.2 
Singapore 40.4 66.0 56.0 71.5 NA 60.2 65.7 60.0 
South Africa 40.0 60.7 66.9 67.6 50.7 NA 58.3 57.4 
Sri Lanka 26.8 40.8 45.0 47.5 43.4 48.8 46.6 42.7 
Swaziland 40.8 49.9 45.8 55.1 47.4 57.7 54.4 50.2 
Trinidad and Tobago 26.2 31.3 30.8 31.1 29.0 36.9 29.9 30.7 
Uganda 37.3 33.0 29.6 37.3 31.0 39.2 36.0 34.8 
UK 46.2 82.6 68.3 82.4 75.0 77.4 NA 72.0 
Tanzania 36.3 42.9 34.5 38.8 31.5 34.5 42.5 37.3 
Vanuatu 39.8 29.6 24.5 34.2 25.9 40.6 34.5 32.7 
Zambia 32.5 37.4 49.8 43.2 29.7 37.4 34.2 37.7 
Source: Authors, based on EORA data  
In synthesis, the TCI analysis shows fairly good GVC trade creation potential between the 
seven Commonwealth hubs, but limited potential for most smaller economies. The indicators, 
nevertheless, are based on existing trade flows while untapped opportunities probably exist 
at micro-level. But exploring business potentialities at firm level would require another type 
of approach. 
a. Specific Supply Chain Complementarities 
All in all, the conclusion from the previous section is not very promising for most of the 
smaller CW economies, due to their limited and undiversified exportable supply basis. TCI 
being calculated on all traded goods and services (exports from the supply side, and imports 
from the demand side), the small size of the domestic economy limits the possibility for a 
small country to supply a significant amount of the full set of imports required by its trade 
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partners. Another way of looking at the trade potential is to focus on specific supply chains, 
and identify as trade potential a situation where the strength of some Commonwealth coun-
tries on some specific products would complement the weaknesses of others.   







Top 10 Top 10 Top 10 
Uganda 24.7 14.5 Pakistan 5.8 19.3 Zambia 2.5 4.3 
Malawi 12.9 20.5 Bangladesh 7.6 13.0 South Africa 1.4 2.1 
Ghana 13.5 13.5 Sri Lanka 4.6 5.0 Kenya 2.9 0.2 
Kenya 10.9 13.9 Mauritius 5.5 3.5 India 1.6 1.1 
Mozambique 12.9 10.7 Lesotho 6.3 1.7 Antigua 2.1 0.3 
Tanzania 9.9 11.7 India 2.0 2.9 Jamaica 0.2 2.2 
Papua New 
Guinea 
3.4 18.0 Tanzania 0.9 2.7 Australia 0.7 1.3 
Sri Lanka 5.9 11.6 Malawi 1.9 0.9 UK 1.0 0.8 
Cameroon 10.1 6.8 Brunei 1.8 0.2 Sierra Leone 1.1 0.3 
Belize 6.3 5.7 Fiji 1.2 0.7 Cyprus 0.8 0.6 
Bottom 10 Bottom 10 Bottom 10 
Seychelles 0.3 0.6 Cameroon 0.3 0.1 Mauritius 0.1 0.1 
UK 0.3 0.3 Samoa 0.0 0.3 Saudi Arabia 0.1 0.1 
Botswana 0.2 0.3 Ghana 0.2 0.1 Lesotho 0.1 0.1 
Barbados 0.2 0.3 Seychelles 0.0 0.2 Vanuatu 0.1 0.1 
Lesotho 0.1 0.4 Singapore 0.2 0.1 Bahamas 0.1 0.1 
Malta 0.2 0.2 Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.1 Papua New 
Guinea 
0.1 0.1 
Singapore 0.2 0.2 Vanuatu 0.0 0.2 Malawi 0.1 0.0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.1 0.1 Bahamas 0.0 0.2 Brunei 0.1 0.0 
Saudi Arabia 0.1 0.0 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.1 0.0 Nigeria 0.1 0.0 
Brunei 0.0 0.0 Papua New 
Guinea 
0.0 0.0 Bangladesh 0.1 0.0 









Top 10 Top 10 Top 10 
Malaysia 1.6 2.0 Canada 2.3 1.3 Botswana 0.1 18.5 
Singapore 1.5 1.8 Antigua 0.9 2.6 Tanzania 4.0 3.2 
Malta 1.0 2.3 Cyprus 0.8 1.7 Sri Lanka 1.9 2.8 
UK 1.1 1.0 UK 1.0 1.0 Sierra Leone 1.0 3.0 
Canada 0.8 0.7 South Africa 0.8 0.5 Pakistan 1.8 2.2 
Cyprus 0.6 0.7 Vanuatu 0.2 0.9 India 1.7 1.7 
Swaziland 0.8 0.5 Malta 0.6 0.4 Malta 1.8 1.1 
India 0.7 0.6 Australia 0.5 0.4 Mauritius 0.9 1.8 
Australia 0.7 0.4 Namibia 0.6 0.3 Malaysia 1.4 1.2 
South Africa 0.7 0.3 Botswana 0.6 0.3 Canada 1.1 1.2 
Bottom 10 Bottom 10 Bottom 10 
Bahamas 0.0 0.1 Mauritius 0.0 0.1 Brunei 0.4 0.1 
Lesotho 0.0 0.1 Guyana 0.0 0.1 Singapore 0.1 0.3 
Malawi 0.0 0.1 Jamaica 0.0 0.1 New Zealand 0.2 0.2 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.1 0.0 Papua New 
Guinea 
0.0 0.0 Jamaica 0.1 0.3 
Fiji 0.0 0.1 Nigeria 0.0 0.0 Malawi 0.0 0.3 
Vanuatu 0.0 0.1 Brunei 0.0 0.0 Bangladesh 0.1 0.2 
Guyana 0.0 0.0 Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 Papua New 
Guinea 
0.0 0.2 
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.0 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.1 0.1 
Brunei 0.0 0.0 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.0 0.0 Saudi Arabia 0.1 0.0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.0 0.0 Pakistan 0.0 0.0 Nigeria 0.1 0.0 
Note: Countries’ RCAs are calculated in relation to World trade.  The ranking is based on the RCA average 
for Final and Intermediate products. The seven GVC hubs are identified in bold.  
Source: Authors, based on EORA data  
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Table 10 above shows the top and bottom 10 exporters ranked for their relative comparative 
advantages in exporting a selection of primary and manufactured goods. Note that RCAs are 
based on a comparison of individual exporters’ profiles with World trade: the table provides 
information on actual comparative advantages, and goes beyond a mere comparison within 
the CW countries.  
Countries are ranked according to their RCA average for Final and Intermediate products, 
which may greatly differ in some cases. Indeed, the more complex the production of a final 
good is, the harder it will be for a small country to have a relative comparative advantage in 
this final good. At the contrary, specializing on a smaller set of intermediate products may 
offer an opportunity to diversify exports. This may explain the surprising ranking of Antigua 
who, besides primary export goods such as petroleum products, exports also components for 
the maritime transport equipment industry. 
There are two ways of looking at RCA matches in order to identify trade opportunities. The 
usual one is to pair high and low RCAs to match comparative advantages with comparative 
disadvantages as an indicator of win-win gains-from-trade potential. The second approach, 
proper to GVC trade, is to compare RCAs in exporting final goods and RCAs in exporting in-
termediate goods. Competitive exporters of final products may find profitable to outsource 
and import parts and components from more competitive exporters of intermediate goods.  
From a trade and development point of view, the best situation is when a small developing 
country shows comparative advantages in a sector where a more advanced country has limi-
tations. The industries from the large country will take the role of GVC lead-firms, market-
ing the final product and driving demand for intermediate exports from the smaller country’s 
industries. Unfortunately, most of the existing GVC hubs (the potential GVC leaders are also 
in the top-10 subsets when it comes to competitiveness, with little potential complementarity 
between large and small Commonwealth countries according to this indicator. The exception 
are Singapore and the UK for agriculture and Singapore for textile. These two sectors are 
relatively low-tech and labour intensive; from a lesser developed country, they are the low-
hanging fruits for trade creation and export diversification, provided the resources are ade-
quate and the production is internationally competitive (high RCA).  
Within the top-10 textile sector panel, there are also interesting differences in final and in-
termediate goods. Lesotho, with the second highest RCA in final goods (6.3), has an RCA of 
only 1.7 in intermediate products. It might, for example, benefit from increasing trade with 
Pakistan or Bangladesh where the RCA in intermediate is much higher than the RCA for fi-
nal products. Malawi, Brunei and Fiji, which shows comparative advantages in the exports of 
final goods, would also benefit from importing intermediate tile products from the most com-
petitive CW countries. 
The other manufacture sectors in Table 10 show more limited opportunities of similar na-
ture. The main GVC hubs are also within the group of high RCAs for both final and interme-
diate products. There are a few exceptions. In metal, for example, Kenya has the highest 
RCA for final goods and the lowest for intermediate inputs. It indicates some GVC trade 
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potential with Zambia and South Africa, two exporters with higher RCA in intermediate 
products. In the Other manufacture group, Botswana is specialising in the exports of inter-
mediate products and could become a supplier of parts and components for other countries.  
In synthesis, the analysis of sectoral trade data shows a limited series of opportunities to en-
hance GVC trade within the Commonwealth secretariat. Materializing this potential re-
quires looking more into the detail at individual product level (something outside the scope of 
this report), but also implementing adequate trade and development policies. Indeed, the 
Commonwealth is not an inward-oriented trading block and strengthening CW inter-indus-
try complementarities faces the competition of other countries. For example, Canada shows a 
higher RCA for its exports of final transportation products (e.g., cars) than for related parts 
and components. The Canadian market for such parts and components may, nevertheless, be 
difficult to enter considering that most trade flows in intermediate goods for transport equip-
ment takes place with Mexico and the USA within the USMCA free trade agreement.  
6. Main findings and policy recommendations 
What matters in GVC analysis, i.e. ‘trade in tasks’, is an industry’s competitive advantage 
from an international trade specialisation perspective.16 The competitive advantage is based 
not only on relative competitiveness of a firm, but depends also on monetary (transport costs 
and custom duties) and non-monetary (logistic delays, uncertainties related to the business 
climate) costs.  
Supply and demand are other important factors. For small or medium firms, joining a GVC 
involves fitting into an existing business logic driven by a lead firm - often located in a large 
developed or emerging country - and its first tiers suppliers, some of them being located in the 
same country or in a neighbouring one. Thus, the recommendations must go beyond individual 
countries’ perspective to look at a global inter-industry network perspective.  
The main findings from the study on the integration of Commonwealth countries in the GVC 
show the following:  
• Commonwealth member countries participation in GVCs increased over 1995-2015 but this 
is mainly through non-Commonwealth countries. Most Commonwealth countries are net 
importers of inputs, except Singapore and Malaysia that are net exporters.  
• Three main regional clusters connect GVCs in Asia and Africa, Europe and Australia. Re-
gional linkages between the Commonwealth countries especially in Africa is suggestive of 
the interconnectedness between countries in the region and that the Commonwealth mem-
bership facilitates trade between countries in the African region.  
 
16 Competitive advantage in a GVC is a mix of absolute comparative advantage (cost and quality competi-
tiveness) and complementarity with the other firms in the production network. They are not to be under-
stood as comparative advantages from a Ricardian perspective, which are valid only for countries in the long 
term and do not apply to brick-and-mortar firms. 
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• Deep regional trade agreement membership, such as the European Union or the NAFTA 
impact on GVC participation. Membership of preferential trade agreements and the depth 
of such agreements increase partner countries’ backward GVC participation. 
• In terms of sectors, Textiles, Transport equipment and Chemicals are important for the 
Commonwealth countries, in particular for the United Kingdom, Canada and India. The 
developed Commonwealth countries dominate the Heavy machinery and Metals sector.  
• Large economies, such India, Australia and New Zealand, show limited evidence of forward 
linkages with the Commonwealth and G-20 countries. These do not rely on the Common-
wealth member countries for their inputs but open economies tend to import value-added 
inputs from the G-20 countries. on the contrary, smaller countries tend to be more inward 
oriented with a high level of reliance on domestic inputs.  
• In general, developing countries are dominant in the lower end of the GVC, implying that 
upgrading to more advanced GVCs is required to support Commonwealth countries’ inte-
gration into the GVCs. 
• UK in a central position given its economic size and trade in primary and secondary sector 
trade with the Commonwealth community. For the primary sector, the Caribbean and Af-
rica, countries are on the periphery given these are raw materials suppliers providing in-
puts at the beginning of the GVC to other countries in the region.  
• For trade in manufactured inputs produced by the secondary, large economies act as hubs 
though developed Commonwealth countries, such as the UK and Canada, source less than 
7% of manufacturing inputs from other members. 
There are some empirical shortcomings worth highlighting. First, the lack of data for all the 
Commonwealth countries is an important limitation of this study. Second, the quality of sta-
tistical data on services trade for most developing Commonwealth countries is poor, which does 
not allow a detailed analysis in a sector that offers significant potential.   
The report proposes as set of measures to facilitate the participation of Commonwealth coun-
tries in GVCs with the aim to enable the countries reap benefits from GVC participation. From 
a policy perspective, such an analysis is important given GVC integration implies country’s 
reliance on imported inputs to gain competitiveness (on the import side) and especially in the 
case of developing countries as a means to improve access to export markets. 
• Develop sectoral competitiveness of the less developed (less competitive) Com-
monwealth countries 
Imports make exports: in a GVC, firms rely on the best inputs to produce competitive export-
able output which often requires importing them. Thus, GVC trade is not limited to the capac-
ity of countries to produce a final good in an inter-industrial network, but depends on the 
capacity to provide a specific task contributing to the production of final goods.  
Studies show that GVC participation needs requisites, some of which depend on policy op-
tions under control of national authorities (see World Bank, 2020 for a detailed review).  
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Supply constraints, however, have a much lower impact on GVCs unlike traditional export-
oriented production activities. 
The analysis of Commonwealth countries presents evidence of dependence between countries 
and industry sectors. The findings also confirm that the Commonwealth members are linked 
to GVCs through non-Commonwealth countries suggesting that there is a case to foster strong 
intra-Commonwealth linkages and promote intra-GVC linkages. GVC participation can also 
open up new opportunities that may not have existed in traditional trade-in-final-goods.  
Services trade is not constrained by geographical distance and trade agreement membership 
presents an opportunity for Commonwealth countries. Studies confirm that trade in services, 
through its different modes of delivery or through the “servicification” of GVCs offers the high-
est potential to strengthen inter- Commonwealth trade.  
Baldwin (2012) states ‘building and joining a supply chain are different. For smaller econo-
mies, joining a supply chain is almost by definition finding a niche market. But building an 
industrial basis out of GVCs requires additional effort’. While each strategy would have to be 
country and context-specific, the policy should be cross-sectoral, because GVCs involve firms 
from diverse productive sectors, from agriculture to industry and services. Commonwealth 
countries, such as India, Nigeria, can play an important role in boosting the Commonwealth 
Advantage in the trade space.  
The centrality of South Africa in the African cluster indicates that as trade conditions improve 
for this country it can indirectly benefit the conditions of its trading partners (e.g. Ghana, 
Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and 
Rwanda). Targeted policies to address the supply side constraints are required to be initiated 
with a specific focus on ensuring sectoral competitiveness.  
• Initiate proactive government policies to develop competitive domestic value-chains 
A competitive domestic value-chain is critical for upgrading value-chains in the short and long 
term. Targeted sectoral policies to maximise the absorption potential of the domestic economy 
and strengthening linkages with GVCs are important. Government policies should comple-
ment the business environment with proactive policies to attract foreign investment. National 
governments could consider initiating targeted policies to attract foreign investment through 
special incentives to firms can support country’s entry into GVCs. A proactive governmental 
approach is required to support countries’ participation in the GVCs. Policy measures to de-
velop the Commonwealth countries’ competitiveness include:  
• Measures must support export diversification in developing Commonwealth countries, es-
pecially African countries that are primary products exporters of agricultural or extractive 
(mining) products. Export diversification will mitigate risks and help Commonwealth coun-
tries in Africa to capture the value-added component of the GVC.  
• Developing the ability of less developed Commonwealth countries to absorb new technology 
is recommended. Countries may be considered to have “forward participation” in GVCs, 
since their exports are used in other countries’ manufacturing and those manufactures may 
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in turn be exported. But moving into downstream manufacturing from a primary product 
base generally requires that a country acquire new technological and managerial capabili-
ties.  
• Governments could consider promoting skills development policies, i.e.  support education 
and vocational training, develop ICT and infrastructure, ensure labour market mobility. 
Such measures will reduce overall uncertainty and promote transparency of the business 
climate. 
• Providing a favourable FDI regime is essential to create an attractive business climate. This 
can be complemented with simple procedures for registering foreign investors to attract 
foreign firms to set up production facility in the target country. 
• National governments must initiate policies to address ‘behind the border’ measures to fa-
cilitate GVC participation. Low tariffs complemented with other low border costs, such as 
less time to clear customs, red-tape, are important from a GVC perspective to ensure par-
ticipation.  
• Most Commonwealth developing countries have limited export production capacity. Smaller 
economies are constrained to industrialise through export-oriented industrialisation and, 
therefore, rely on the Export Processing Zones (Low and Tijapa, 2013). While such zones 
can play a determining role as incubators, the successful experiences are those that gener-
ate upstream and downstream opportunities for other domestic firms. This may require 
additional, and more horizontal, economic policies. 
• The international community and international institutions could also provide support in 
the form of logistics and trade facilitation, facilitate legislation on the regulation of business 
services, investment, business taxation, innovation, industrial development, support con-
vergence with conformity to international standards, and the wider business environment 
to foster entrepreneurship. 
 
• Ensure quality institutions and support preferential liberalisation  
Institutional quality matters, and improving global and regional trade governance through the 
relevant multilateral and regional forums is key for providing an enabling business environ-
ment to harness the GVC potential of Commonwealth countries. Countries with better insti-
tutional quality exhibit stronger GVC participation and export in more contractually intensive 
sectors (World Bank, 2020).  Institutional quality can also be enhanced through memberships 
of new FTA, which cover legal and regulatory frameworks, harmonize customs procedures, and 
set the rules on intellectual property rights. The World Bank (2020) finds that membership of 
preferential trade agreements and the depth of those agreements increase backward GVC par-
ticipation. The Commonwealth countries that are FTA members could use existing FTAs as a 
mechanism to increase participation in the GVCs. 
Some ongoing trade liberalisation initiatives involve Commonwealth countries, such as the 
Continental Free Trade Agreement in Africa, the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Rela-
tions and in Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations (even with 
India having withdrawn). Because most Commonwealth countries are members of trade 
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agreements which can in some way limit the possibility of negotiating separate preferential 
agreements with third countries – UK’s membership of the EU being probably the best exam-
ple - the margin for tariff negotiations is somewhat reduced. But such constraints do not exist 
for non-tariff measures, especially if it follows the path of mutual recognition.  
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7. Annex on Data and Methodology  
A.1 Input-Output tables and preliminary data processing 
The initial Eora database covers 190 countries and 26 sectors, from 1990 to 2015. To simplify 
the data processing, the first task was to reduce the size of the geographical coverage, in or-
der to include only the Commonwealth (CW) countries and other main trade partners that 
belong to the G20. All other countries were aggregated into the Rest of the World (ROW) re-
gion. The resulting MRIO counts with 58 countries or regions and 26 sectors, resulting in a 
matrix of 1508 lines and 1508 columns. This Multi-Regional IO table served as the basis for 
the calculation of all TiVA indicators. 
Nevertheless, the huge amount of information generated cannot be easily analysed from a 
global perspective; moreover (and more importantly from a statistical perspective) the qual-
ity of the sectoral data is mediocre. In order to have more robust a basis for empirical analy-
sis, the sectoral GVC indicators resulting from the TiVA analysis were aggregated into four 
categories: Primary sectors (agriculture, fisheries and mining), Secondary sectors (Manufac-
ture), Tertiary sector (commercial and administrative services) and a group of “Other sec-
tors” where the quality of data was deemed particularly weak (e.g., recycling, household ser-
vices, re-exports and re-imports). The resulting inter-sectoral trade flows between the 58 
countries and region defines a much smaller table of 174 by 174. 
A.2 Measuring Trade in Value Added.  
In a global value chain, the final value of a product results from the aggregation of the contri-
bution of many industries, some of them being located in different countries. The objective of 
the trade in value-analysis (TiVA) is to disentangle the origin and contribution of the differ-
ent contributions.  The final value of a product is the sum of the various contributions, as 
measured by the value-added contributed by each industry in each country of the chain.  
The first difference with traditional trade analysis is that TiVA analysis includes both the 
supply and the demand side, including final demand (the products required to satisfy con-
sumption and investment). Another difference is that TiVA analysis is not based on directly 
observable trade flows (direct requirements) but on a more systemic approach: the total re-
quirements and their value-added content. It means that not only bilateral trade flows are 
taken into consideration, but also all the other transactions that were indirectly activated by 
the direct requirements.  
Let’s take an example, based on a two country-two product model such as Table 11. Two 
countries A and B produce primary and processed goods.  In column, we see the require-
ments in inputs plus the value-added (labour, capital) required by the production. In line, we 
see the allocation of the output (or sales) for use as intermediate or final demand consump-
tion.  
The matrix of technical coefficients, also known as direct requirements, is obtained by divid-
ing the material inputs required in each column by the industry’ s total output (value-added 
is not part of this calculation). 
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Table 11 Simplified International Input-Output Table 
 Country A Country A Total product sales Total 
 Primary Secondary Primary Secondary  Intermediate Final Output 
A.Primary 80 50 10 10 150 200 350 
A.Secondary 30 80 0 5 115 250 365 
A.Secconday 40 5 40 30 115 170 285 
A.Secondary 2 10 30 100 142 200 342 
Value Added 198 220 205 197    
Output 350 365 285 342    
Note: For illustration purpose only.  
The result, often called the “A” matrix in input-output analysis, is a 4x4 matrix as in Table 
12. It provides the value and origin of the requirements needed to produce one unit of output.  
Table 12 Simplified Technical Coefficients  
 A.Primary A.Secondary B.Primary B.Secondary 
A.Primary 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.03 
A.Secondary 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.01 
B.Primary 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.09 
B.Secondary 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.29 
Note: For illustration purpose only.  
Indeed, in order to produce 100 of output, the primary sector of B will purchase 4 from the A’ 
s primary sector, 14 from other primary sector firms in B and 11 of B’s manufactures. This is 
a secondary requirement that is indirectly created by the initial production plan. In turn, 
satisfying with additional production this second wave will induce a third round of indirect 
requirements, and so on and so forth. The series of round can be expressed as a power expan-
sion of the A matrix, starting with I, an identity matrix of 1 on the diagonal and 0 elsewhere: 
I + A + A2 + A3 + … + An 
 I matrix indicates the initial demand of output (normalised to 1).  Because the technical co-
efficients are positive numbers smaller than 0, the suite converges rapidly to its limit, called 
the Leontief inverse L=(I-A)-1. The suite of indirect requirements and the resulting Leontief 
inverse corresponding to our model are in Error! Reference source not found.. As shown, we 
obtain a satisfactory approximation of L with only 5 rounds.  
A2.1 From direct to total requirements 
The total (direct and indirect) requirements are obtained by subtracting the initial demand I 
from the Leontief inverse. In order to produce 100 of output, the primary sector of B will indi-
rectly generate and additional output of 6.3 from the A’ s primary sector (instead of only 4 di-
rectly required), 19 from other primary sector firms in B instead of 14 and 17.8 of B’s manu-
factures (compared to 11 of direct requirements). Interestingly, B’s primary sector will also 
induce an additional production of 1 from A’s manufacture, despite the fact that it did not di-
rectly require any inputs from it. This is due to the fact that the suppliers of B’s primary sec-
tor did use A’s manufacture to produce the inputs it required.  
The matrix of total requirements is based on material flows of products. It is easy, thanks to 
IO algebra, to compute the flow of income representing the remuneration of the tasks each 
industry along the global value chain contributed to the final output. This operation, called 
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the “GVC Leontief Decomposition” is performed by pre-multiplying L by a matrix V where 
the diagonal elements are the value-added ratios (0.57, 0.60, 0.72 and 0.58 for A and B sec-
tors, respectively) and all other elements are set to 0.   
The result for the simplified model is shown below. Note an important outcome: the sum of 
value-added created is equal to the value of the final output. In other words, the production 
of products through the GVC generate enough income for supply=demand and provide the 
conditions for a general equilibrium situation (actually, the actual input-output matrices ob-
served in the reality are expressions of an equilibrium situation, as long as the observation 
period corresponds to a “normal” situation). Obviously, this identity holds at the global level 
but may not apply at national one, engendering balance of payments surplus or deficits if de-
mand is lower or larger than income generation.  
Table 13 Embodied Value-Added for 100$ of final products in the simplified model  
 A.Primary A.Secondary B.Primary B.Secondary 
A.Primary 75.4 13.4 3.5 3.8 
A.Secondary 8.9 78.8 0.6 2.1 
B.Primary 13.2 4.2 85.6 11.2 
B.Secondary 2.5 3.5 10.2 82.9 
Value Added 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
A2.2 GVC indicators 
There are many options for analysing global value chains. The first step is always to decom-
pose the flows of value-added according to their source and uses. A first set of measures de-
compose value chains to identify “Who Produces for Whom”; a second type of indicators tries 
to measure the length of the GVCs.  
• GVC decomposition 
The paper applies two approaches. The Leontief decomposition of GVC trade is closely re-
lated to the table of total requirements, but instead of indicating the gross value of produc-
tion, it indicates the origin of the value-added embodied into the production, as in Table 13 
above. Applied to exports flows, it shows the contribution of all trade partners in the value of 
the products exported by a given industry.  
The other decomposition by Wang, Wei and Zhu (2013) further decomposes the value added 
into several sub-components. WWZ decomposition is rather complex (see Figure 12) and it is 
not the place here to go much into details; we refer the readers to Wang, Wei and Zhu (2013) 
and Quast and Kummritz (2015). For example, DVA_FIN represents the domestic VA em-
bodied in exports of final product. Those products are consumed (absorbed) in the importing 
country and do not continue participating in a value chain. DVA_INT is the VA embodied in 
intermediate goods that will be further processed as final goods and absorbed by the im-
porter. DVA_INTrex correspond to the exported domestic value-added that is reprocessed by 
the importing country and re-exported to third countries as intermediate goods. DVA_INTrex 
is further split into three categories according to its use by the second importer. 
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Figure 12 WWZ Decomposition of Domestic Value-Added embodied in Gross Exports 
 
Source: Wang, Wei and Zhu (2013) 
RDV concerns the domestic value added that returns to the exporter, embodied in imports of 
final or in intermediate goods. Other terms ─not included in Figure 4 which deals only with 
the domestic value-added content of gross exports─ correspond to other concepts: MVA is the 
foreign value-added embodied in the exports and sourced from the importing country, OVA is 
the foreign value-added embodied sourced from all other countries. MVA and OVA are fur-
ther split according to their use for intermediate of final goods. DDC, ODC and MDC capture 
double counting, a statistical issue happening when trade takes place within GVCs. Because 
pure double counting of foreign value-added in a country’s exports can only occur when there 
is back and forth trade of intermediate goods, it is also an indirect indicator of the deepening 
of GVC trade (Wang, Wei and Zhu, 2013). 
• GVC length, upward and forward linkages 
Another widely used set of indicators is the length of a value-chain and the position (up-
stream or downstream) in this chain. These indicators are also calculated on the input-out-
put matrix and derive from the concept of “backward and forward linkages” introduced by 
Hirschman (1958). The linkage concept is generalised to the observation that an increase in 
ongoing activities induce other industries to undertake new activities. Backward linkage ef-
fects are related to derived (upstream) demand for intermediate inputs required. Forward 
linkage effects (downstream) are related to the intermediate output utilisation, i.e. the out-
put from a given activity will allow other industries to use it as inputs in some new activities. 
The backward linkages, in Hirshman’s view, constitute a pull effect (similar to the Leontief 
model) while the forward linkages create a push effect (called the Ghosh model). 
This concept has been adapted to analyse the participation of an industry in the global econ-
omy. The GVC participation of a given industry for a particular country is traditionally 
measured as the foreign value added embodied in its production (usually, taking only the ex-
ports) plus its domestic value-added that is used by other industries in foreign countries to 
produce their own exports. The first measure is called backward GVC linkage and the second 
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one forward GVC linkage; the ratio of forward over backward measures provides an indicator 
of the relative position of this Particular industry: if the ratio is greater than 1, the industry 
is considered to be in an upstream situation. At the contrary, if its forward linkages are 
smaller than the backwards, it is a downstream industry, meaning it is relatively close to the 
end of the GVC (final demand). The indicator is usually constructed on the basis of the Leon-
tief decomposition (total requirements), but we will also present it based on the simpler di-
rect requirements. Actually, this direct approach, based on input and output actually pur-
chased by the industry, is more meaningful from a business perspective and easier to factor-
in when promoting evidence-based policy making.  
Similarly, the length of a value chain can be measured in two directions: forward, as the dis-
tance to the final consumer; backward, as the distance to the most upstream supplier. The 
literature offers various options to calculate these two measures, and the length of GVCs has 
been trending up since the late 1990s (see Wang, Wei and Zhu, 2013 for a review). Most of 
the measures are based on the concept of Average Propagation Length (see below).  
It is worth mentioning that these indicators are the subject of some debate in the community 
of TiVA analysts. In some cases, it is difficult to characterize the particular role of an indus-
try: a particular bank will provide credit to farmers (upstream activity) and to final consum-
ers (downstream). The ratio will give some idea of what is the main business of this particu-
lar bank, but the industry average over all particular banks may not be much informative. 
Another more technical point of discussion is that these measures are intuitively based on 
the false idea that GVCs are linear chains. Actually, the Leontief inverse which measures to-
tal requirements is based on a series of loops.  
GVC Upward and Downward length  
There are many different ways of measuring the length of a GVC. Most derive from the ap-
plication of the Average Propagation Length, as defined in Dietzenbacher, Romero, and 
Bosma (2005).  We use Escaith and Inomata (2013) presentation here:  
        Input Coefficient Matrix                 Impact Delivery Paths 
                  
Suppose we have an economic system of n industrial sectors with a production structure de-
fined by the input coefficient matrix A as shown in Figure A.1. Input coefficients aij are calcu-
lated from an input–output table by dividing input values of goods and services used in each 
industry by the industry’s corresponding total output, i.e., aij = zij / xj where zij is the value of 
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industry j. Thus, the coefficients represent the direct requirement of inputs for producing just 
one unit of output of industry j.  
The vertical sequence of demand propagation can be depicted as follows. Let us consider the 
impact of demand for 100 units in industry 3 on the output of industry 1. The simplest form 
of all is given by the direct linkage [3→1], which is calculated as a product of multiplying 100 
units by input coefficient a13. This is because a13, by definition of an input coefficient, repre-
sents an immediate amount of products of industry 1 required for producing just one unit of 
products of industry 3. Alternatively, there is a two-step path going through another indus-
try, such as [3→2→1]. This is derived by two-stage multiplication, that is, 100 units by a23 
and then by a12. There can also be a two-step path going through the same industry, such as 
[3→3→1] or [3→1→1], which would be derived, respectively, as 100 × a33 × a13 and 100 × a13 
× a11 (see Figure A.2). 
The exercise reveals that the impact of any two-step path, whatever the sequence of indus-
tries, can be given by feeding back a set of direct impacts, A Δd, into the input coefficient ma-
trix, that is, A × A Δd = A2 Δd, where Δd is an initial demand injection. Similarly, the impact 
of three-step paths is given by A × A2 Δd = A3 Δd, and so on. The amount of impact shown in 
each layer of Aks (k=1, 2, 3, ...) is a result of the initial demand injection passing through all 
k-step paths. It captures the effect of every direct and indirect linkage that undergoes exactly 
the kth round steps or stages of the production process. 
The Leontief inverse matrix L, which shows the total amount of goods and services required 
for the production of one unit of output, can be expanded as an arithmetic series, that is, L = 
(I - A)-1 = I + A + A2 + A3 + A4 + ..., where I is an identity matrix (with 1 in diagonal elements 
and 0 elsewhere). It is immediately clear that the equation represents the decomposition of 
the total impact on output into its constituent layers according to the number of production 
stages involved. Matrix I corresponds to an initial (unit) demand injection and the following 
Aks are interpreted as progressive impacts of the initial demand when supply chains are 
sliced at the kth stage of the production process. 
With this preliminary understanding, average propagation lengths are specified as: 
APL(ji) = 1*aij / (lij – δij)+ 2*[A2]ij / (lij – δij) + 3*[A3]ij / (lij – δij)+ ... = ∑ 𝑘 ([𝐀𝐤]ij ∑ [𝐀𝐤]ij∞k=1⁄ )∞𝑘=1 , 
where A is an input coefficient matrix, aij are its elements, lij are the Leontief inverse coeffi-
cients, δij is a Kronecker delta which is 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, and k is the number of pro-
duction stages along the path. We also define APL(ji) = 0 when (lij – δij) = 0. 
The first term on the right side of the equation above shows that the impact delivered 
through one-step paths (k = 1), i.e. direct impact, amounts to a aij / (lij – δij) share of the total 
impact given by the Leontief inverse coefficients (less unity for diagonal elements). Similarly, 
two-step paths (k = 2) contribute a [A2]ij / (lij – δij) share, and three-step paths (k = 3) give a 
[A3]ij/ (lij – δij) share of the total impact. This is evident from L = I + A + A2 + A3 + ... which is 
rearranged as L – I =A + A2 + A3 + ..., and hence (L – I)ij = (lij – δij) = Aij + [A2]ij + [A3]ij + .... 
